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Disloyalty without Limits:
"Independent" Directors and the Elimination of the
Duty of Loyalty
J. Robert Brown, Jr I
I. INTRODUCTION
W HATEVER one might say about the duties of corporate managers, there
has been universal agreement that they must remain loyal to the
company' While loyalty can have a variety of meanings, the term unques-
tionably encompasses the notion that directors cannot use their position
to profit unfairly from the company.3 It is this bedrock concept of fairness
that theoretically places limits on self-interested transactions, particularly
executive compensation.
Notwithstanding continued paeans to this proposition,4 Delaware courts
have all but eliminated meaningful limits on self-interested transactions.'
Loans to officers and directors, for example, need not meet commercially
reasonable standards; 6 top officers may be paid excessive sums with no ju-
I Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law; law clerk, Honorable Frank M.
Johnson, Jr., United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. B.A. 1978, College of
William & Mary; J.D. 198o, University of Maryland School of Law; Ph.D. 1993, Georgetown
University. Thanks to Celia Taylor, Donald Clark, and Harvey Gelb for reading a draft and
providing comments.
2 The seminal case in the area is probably Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.zd 503 (Del. 1939). A
debate did at one time appear in the literature about the possibility of shareholders and man-
agement contracting away the duty of loyalty. The topic ebbed without significant changes in
the corporate law context. With respect to other entities, however, waiver or limits on the duty
of loyalty have been permitted. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101 (Zoo6) (allowing waiver of
fiduciary duties in operating agreement of limited liability company).
3 See FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 837.6o (2006) ("The duty
of loyalty is transgressed when a corporate fiduciary, whether director or officer, uses his or
her corporate office to promote, advance or effectuate a transaction between the corporation
and such person, and that transaction is not substantively fair to the corporation." (citations
omitted)).
4 Courts usually cite the hortatory language in Guth v. Loft, Inc. See, e.g., In re LNR Prop.
Corp. S'holders Litig., 896 A.2d 169, 175 (Del. Ch. 2005); Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana,
Inc., 891 A.2d 150, 191 (Del. Ch. 2oo5), afftd, 906 A.zd 114 (Del. 2006).
5 Or, as one commentator has described, the Delaware courts have caused the duty to lie
in a "persistent vegetative state." Park McGinty, The Twilight of Fiduciary Duties: On the Needfor
Shareholder Self-Help in an Age of Formalistic Proceduralism, 46 EMORY L.J. 163, 169 (1997).
6 The facts surrounding Bernie Ebbers' $4o0 million loan from Worldcom, for example,
suggests that it was not on commercially reasonable terms. See Worldcom, Inc., Current Report
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dicial oversight of the fairness of the amount;' and contributions may be
made to charities favored by the CEO almost without limit.
8
This did not happen all at once. Courts initially viewed conflict-of-
interest transactions with considerable suspicion, often treating them as
voidable. 9 Over time, that approach gave way to a more workable rule re-
quiring that the transaction be fair.10 Fairness amounted, to a substantive
limit-managers could profit from the corporation so long as they did not
profit unfairly.
These limits, however, no longer apply. With little discussion, Delaware
courts devised a set of procedures that rendered fairness irrelevant. So long
as approved by a "neutral" decision-making body, a conflict-of-interest
transaction is subject to review under the business judgment rule, a proce-
dural standard rarely overcome and one that does not involve an examina-
tion of the terms of the transaction.1 This approach contains serious flaws,
some practical, some analytical, and some procedural.
(Form 8-K), at 292 (June 9, 2003) ("The loans from WorldCom provided Ebbers the funds
with which to conduct his personal business affairs at advantageous interest rates. In making
these loans and guaranties, WorldCom assumed risks that no financial institution was willing
to assume. The Company did not have a perfected security interest in any collateral for the
loans for most of the time period during which they were outstanding."). To the extent that
limits on such loans exist, they emanate from federal mandates rather than fiduciary obliga-
tions. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(k) (West zoo6). That particular limitation was only recently added
by section 402 of Sarbanes-Oxley.
7 The amounts paid to top executives are substantial by any measure. See Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, Discussion Paper No. 510, in ThE
HAsARD JOHN M. OLIN DiscussioN PAPER SERIES (Harvard Law School ed., 2005) (noting that
from 1993 to 2003, the top five executives at public companies totaled $288 billion and from
2001 to 2003 they totaled about ten percent of all earnings). The Securities and Exchange
Commission has adopted reforms designed to improve disclosure of executive compensation.
See Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
54302A,' 71 Fed. Reg. 53158 (Sept. 8, zoo6).
8 See infra notes 19, 40 and accompanying text.
9 See Harold Marsh, Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus.
LAw. 35, 36 (1966).
io See Freeman v. Decio, 584 F2d 186, 193 (7th Cir. 1978) ("Similarly, when scrutinizing
transactions between a director or officer and the corporation under the light of the duty of
loyalty, most courts now inquire as to whether there was any injury to the corporation, i.e.,
whether the transaction was fair and in good faith, before permitting the latter to avoid the
transaction."); see also Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 Ead 255, 265 (zd Cir. 1984)
("Once self-dealing or bad faith is demonstrated, the duty of loyalty supersedes the duty of
care, and the burden shifts to the directors to 'prove that the transaction was fair and reason-
able to the corporation."' (quoting Treadway Cos., Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d
Cir. 198o))).
I I The distinction matters. See Joel Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV.
1, 7-8 (1993) ("The difference between a duty of loyalty review of a transaction where the de-
fendants have the burden of persuading a court that the transaction was fair-that is, it would
have been approved by a disinterested board negotiating at arm's length with a stranger-and
a business judgment rule analysis, where the plaintiff must persuade the court that a director
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Analytically, the business judgment rule was not meant to apply to con-
flict-of-interest transactions.' I Instead, it arose as an over-inclusive measure
designed to protect managerial risk-taking. The business judgment rule
does so by rendering the consequences of a decision essentially irrelevant.
As long as the process used to make the decision is adequate, liability will
not attach. 3 The rationale does not apply, however, where the harm results
not from risk-taking but from a conflict of interest.'4
Delaware courts, however, have und'rne this approach. They apply the
business judgment rule to cases involving a conflict of interest where a
majority of the board is characterized as disinterested and independent.'5 It
makes no difference that the conflict remains present in the decision-mak-
ing process. Indeed, the interested directors can sit in on the discussions,
participate in the debate, and even vote on the transaction without the
board losing its "neutral" status.
From a practical standpoint, Delaware courts do not adequately ensure
that directors defined as independent are in fact independent. They rou-
tinely ignore evidence of a director's connections to the interested party
or officer did not rationally believe that his or her business judgment was in the best interests
of the corporation (a burden requiring proof in Delaware of the equivalent to gross negli-
gence), is a fundamental one in corporate law. Directors and officers very rarely lose lawsuits
when they are subject to a business judgment rule review. The odds are considerably less
favorable when directors or officers themselves must prove the fairness of contracts or transac-
tions they enter with their corporations.").
12 William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function over Form: A Reassessment
of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 Bus. LAw. 1287 n.43 (2001) ("When it
took that step, the law reflected the policy concern that an overly aggressive approach to en-
forcing the duty of care could deter risk-taking and discourage service on corporate boards by
qualified candidates."); see also George W. Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder
Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 96, 135 (198o) (noting that the
business judgment rule "insulare[s] from liability directors who have made mistaken decisions
resulting in corporate losses, notwithstanding their good faith and exercise of due care").
13 Thus, liability may not be imposed for negligent mismanagement. Delaware courts
require at least a showing of gross negligence. See infra notes 22, 27. In fact, the standard is
probably higher.
14 See Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Needfor Substantive Review, 8z WASH. U. L.Q.
821, 834-35 (2004) ("Although the interests of directors usually are aligned with those of the
shareholders, there are times when their interests conflict. In those situations, the deference
afforded to directors by the business judgment rule is wholly inappropriate. Thus, when
a plaintiff can establish a cognizable duty of loyalty issue, the protections of the business
judgment rule are lost, and the directors' actions are reviewed under the entire fairness test."
(footnote omitted)).
15 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (indicating that a transaction in-
volving a conflict of interest is protected by the business judgment rule if it is approved by
a majority consisting of the disinterested directors), overruled in part by Brehm v. Eisner, 746
A.zd 244 (Del. zooo).
2oo6-2oo7]
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and apply shifting and inconsistent tests.1 6 As a result, boards treated as
having a majority of independent directors often in fact do not.
Procedurally, Delaware courts use pleading rules that prevent full ex-
amination of a director's relationship with the interested party. Facts re-
butting the presumption of independence must be pled with particularity.
Courts use this heightened standard to dismiss cases on motion without
allowing for discovery. They do so even where plaintiffs have produced
facts suggesting an absence of independence and where the additional in-
formation about the relationship is not publicly available. 7
Despite the presence of interested influence in the decision making
process and the absence of truly independent directors, courts apply the
business judgment rule and defer to the board's decision. The results are
predictable. They effectively ensure interested approval of interested
transactions. Thus, the system can result in a salary of $140 million paid
for slightly more than one year of unsatisfactory work, 8 $130 million paid
to build a museum to house the CEO's art collection, 9 and a $400 million
loan on highly favorable terms, 0 without any examination of the fairness of
the transaction.
This article will do four things. First, it will examine the evolution of
the duty of loyalty, focusing on the replacement of fairness with the proce-
dural "safeguards" of the business judgment rule. Second, the article will
examine the definition of independence under Delaware law, concluding
that directors who are not independent are routinely characterized as such.
Third, it will analyze how boards use procedural requirements to prevent
full examination of the independence issue. Finally, the article will suggest
changes designed to ensure that limits on disloyalty remain in place and
that fairness continues to matter.
16 See, e.g., Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.zd
1040, 1o5o (Del. 2004) ("Allegations of mere personal friendship or a mere outside business
relationship, standing alone, are insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about a director's in-
dependence.").
17 This can be seen from even a cursory reading of the cases. In rare moments of candor,
the courts have occasionally acknowledged the problem. See infra note 2 1 and accompanying
text.
18 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 253 (Del. zooo).
19 See Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 199i).
20 See supra note 6. The amount included both loans and guarantees. The loans were
challenged not for violation of fiduciary obligations but for violations of the securities laws. See
In reWorldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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II. THE DECLINE OF THE DUTY OF LOYALTY
A. Fairness and the Duty of Care
The sine qua non of a director's fiduciary duty is fairness. In cases not in-
volving a conflict of interest, actions taken by the board are presumed fair,"'
and are protected by the business judgment rule."2 Setting aside the busi-
ness judgment rule requires evidence of a procedural deficiency; 3 the ac-
tual substance of the transaction and its fairness are largely irrelevant.
2 4
The business judgment rule is over-inclusive, exonerating more than
good-faith errors of judgment or reasonable mistakes. To overcome the
presumption plaintiffs must show at least gross negligence, and even then
the ubiquitous s presence of waiver of liability provisions 6 will ordinarily
21 The business judgment rule does not apply to board inaction. See Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.zd 805, 813 (Del. 1984) ("However, it should be noted that the business judgment rule
operates only in the context of director action. Technically speaking, it has no role where
directors have either abdicated their functions, or absent a conscious decision, failed to act.
But it also follows that under applicable principles, a conscious decision to refrain from acting
may nonetheless be a valid exercise of business judgment and enjoy the protections of the
rule."), overruled in parr by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2ooo). For the standards ap-
plicable to inaction, sometimes labeled the duty to monitor, see In re Caremark International,
Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
22 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 81z. Said another way, "directors' decisions will be respected by
courts unless the directors are interested or lack independence relative to the decision, do
not act in good faith, act in a manner that cannot be attributed to a rational business purpose
or reach their decision by a grossly negligent process that includes the failure to consider all
material facts reasonably available." Brehm, 746 A.zd at 264 n.66. This article does not address
the heightened standards of board behavior that occurs during a change of control. For discus-
sion on that topic, see, for example, Revlon v. MacAndrews &Forbes Holding, 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1985) and Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.zd 946 (Del. 1985).
23 Wells M. Engledow, Structuring Corporate BoardAction to Meet the Ever-Decreasing Scope
of Revlon Duties, 63 ALE. L. REV. 505, 508 (1999) ("Thus, at bottom, the business judgment
rule reflects little more than process inquiry."). Successfully rebutting the presumption of
the business judgment rule does not result in per se liability. Instead, the burden shifts to the
directors to show the "entire fairness" of the transaction. See McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 91o,
923 (Del. 2000); Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d iI56, 1162 (Del. 1995); Cede &
Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345,361 (Del. 1993), modified, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994).
24 See infra note 34. Fairness does matter where the presumption of the business judg-
ment rule is set aside. This, however, occurs rarely. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858
(Del. 1984).
25 All fifty states have in place provisions that either limit liability of a breach of the duty
of care or permit corporations to remove liability in the articles of incorporation. SeeJ. Robert
Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the Regulation of Public Companies, 38 U.
RICH. L. REV. 317, 331-32 (2004).
26 See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.zd 85, 92 (Del. zoo0) ("Thus, under those spe-
cific circumstances, when the presumption of the business judgment rule has been rebutted
in the shareholder complaint solely by successfully alleging a duty of care violation, the direc-
tor defendants do not have to prove entire fairness to the trier of fact, because of the exculpa-
tion afforded to the directors by the section Io2(b)(7) provision inserted by the shareholders
2006-2007]
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prevent recovery! 7 Plaintiffs are reduced to claims for waste 8 which is
an extraordinarily difficult standard to meet, 9 and one "very rarely satis-
fied."30
The business judgment rule protects risk-taking. Directors know that
so long as they engage in proper procedures, they will be insulated from
liability even if the transaction proves unsuccessful and causes harm to the
company.3 The underlying logic does not apply, however, where the harm
results from other motivations such as a desire to benefit parties interested
in the outcome of the transaction.
B. Fairness and the Duty of Loyalty
1. Obligation to Prove Fairness.-At least some early courts considered the
risks associated with self-dealing so great that they treated them as void-
into the corporation's charter."); Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, io94 (Del. 2001) ("As
plaintiffs conceded in oral argument before this Court, if there is only an unambiguous, re-
sidual due care claim and nothing else-as a matter of law-then Section ioz(b)(7) would bar
the claim.").
27 See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 750 (Del. Ch. zoo5),
aff'dsub nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2oo6) ("Because duty of care violations are
actionable only if the directors acted with gross negligence, and because in most instances
money damages are unavailable to a plaintiff who could theoretically prove a duty of care
violation, duty of care violations are rarely found." (footnotes omitted)).
28 Waste "entails an exchange of corporate assets for consideration so disproportionately
small as to lie beyond the range at which any reasonable person might be willing to trade."
Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.zd 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) (citations omitted).
29 See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d at 748-49 ("Corporate waste is
very rarely found in Delaware courts because the applicable test imposes such an onerous
burden upon a plaintiff-proving 'an exchange that is so one sided that no business person of
ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the corporation has received adequate consid-
eration."' (footnote omitted)).
30 Steiner v. Meyerson, No. 15452, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 95, at *3 (Del. Ch. July 19,
1995);see also Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.zd 244,263 (Del. 2000) (waste applicable in "unconscio-
nable case where directors irrationally squander or give away corporate assets."); Harbor Fin.
Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 892 (Del. Ch. 1999) ("The pleading burden on a plaintiff
attacking a corporate transaction as wasteful is necessarily higher than that of a plaintiff chal-
lenging a transaction as 'unfair' as a result of the director's conflicted loyalties or lack of due
care." (footnote omitted)). Some courts have questioned the need for an action for waste that
survives, the application of the business judgment rule. See id. at 895. Nonetheless, courts
have long recognized that a board can be insulated from waste only by obtaining unanimous
approval of shareholders. See Lewis, 699 A.2d at 327; Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 6oz, 605 (Del. Ch.
1962).
3 1 The risk of failure is not irrelevant but close to it. The risk would be part of the "best
interests" prong of the business judgment rule. To the extent failure was a certainty, it would
be hard to argue that the transaction was in the best interests of the shareholders. On the
other hand, to the extent failure was a strong possibility, a board could easily decide that it was
still a risk worth taking.
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able.32 Excessively narrow, the approach threatened to interfere with trans-
actions beneficial to the corporation. Consequently, courts opted for a less
restrictive test, allowing the transactions if substantively and procedurally
fair. Procedural fairness meant approval by shareholders or disinterested
directors.33 Substantive fairness required "the earmarks of an arm's length
bargain."' By the mid-twentieth century, however, it was enough to show
substantive fairness,35 with the burden on the board.36
2. Elimination ofFairness.-The need to show substantive fairness imposed
real limits on self-dealing. The approach did not prohibit transactions of
unusual amounts or unusual terms, but it did impose on the board the obli-
gation to affirmatively justify such transactions. Subject to personal liability
for violations, directors were presumably less willing to approve self-inter-
ested transactiol s that might later be characterized as unfair. Thus, the
32 Marsh, supra note 9, at 36-39; see also Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 466 (Del. 1991)
("At common law, a corporation's stockholders did have the power to nullify an interested
transaction, although considerations of the transaction's fairness appear to have played some
part in judicial decisions applying this rule." (citations omitted)). Not everyone agrees with
this early characterization. See generally Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., The Corporate Director's
Fiduciary Duty of Loyally: Understanding the Self-Interested Director Transaction, 41 DEPAUL L.
REV. 655, 659-62 (1992) (asserting that interested director contracts were not always voidable);
see also Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., Interested Director Contracts at Common Law: Validation under
the Doctrine of Constructive Fraud, 33 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 97, 98 (1999) (noting that Professor
Marsh's assertion has come under attack).
33 Marsh, supra note 9, at 39-40 ("[Tlhe general rule was that a contract between a
director and his corporation was valid if it was approved by a disinterested majority of his
fellow directors and was not found to be unfair or fraudulent by the court if challenged; but
that a contract in which a majority of the board was interested was voidable at the instance
of the corporation or its shareholders without regard to any question of fairness." (footnote
omitted)).
34 Byelick v. Vivadelli, 79 E Supp. 2d 61o,629 (E.D. Va. 1999) (quoting Moneta v. Willard
Bldg. Supply Co., 515 S.E.2d 277, 287 (Va. 1999)). As one commentator noted, fairness repre-
sented what "would have been approved by a disinterested board negotiating at arm's length
with a stranger .. " Joel Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 7 (1993)
(footnote omitted).
35 Harvey Gelb, Corporate Governance and the Independence Myth, 6 Wyo. L. REV. 129, 130
(2oo6) ("The general rule by the mid-twentieth century would uphold the validity of a trans-
action even in the absence of a disinterested director majority vote unless it was found by the
court to be unfair to the corporation.").
36 See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1222 (Del. 1999) ("Once the entire fair-
ness standard has been implicated, as here, the defendants, at least initially, bear the burden
of demonstrating the two basic aspects of fair dealing and fair price." (citation omitted)); Mills
Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 128o (Del. 1989) ("When faced with such
divided loyalties, directors have the burden of establishing the entire fairness of the transac-
tion to survive careful scrutiny by the courts."); Keenan v. Eshleman, 2 A.2d 904 (Del. 1938)
("In the second place, dealing as they did with another corporation of which they were sole




burden of showing fairness threatened to generate a risk-averse approach
to these types of transactions.
Courts took a number of steps to mitigate the full implications of the
obligation to show fairness. They limited the category of "self-dealing"
transactions that triggered application of the duty of loyalty. The duty did
not apply, for example, where the benefits were shared equally by all share-
holders,37 despite the continued risk of self-serving behavior.38 Neither was
the duty held applicable to transactions where the conflict was immaterial39
or involving non-pecuniary gain.4°
The most significant inroads, however, involved the use of process as a
substitute for substantive fairness. The courts concluded, with almost no
analysis, that fairness would be presumed where the transaction was ap-
proved by a board containing a majority of independent and disinterested
directors. In those circumstances, review would be limited to the almost
insurmountable business judgment rule.41
37 See Fink v. Weill, No. 02 Civ. 10250, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2o659, at *12 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 19, 2005) ("A director is considered to be interested where the director is positioned to
receive a personal financial benefit from a transaction that would not be equally shared by
the corporation or shareholders or where a transaction would be materially detrimental to the
director but not to the corporation or shareholders." (citation omitted) (applying Delaware
law)); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.zd 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (noting that directors must obtain a
"personal financial benefit" as opposed to a benefit "which devolves upon the corporation
or all stockholders generally" (citations omitted)), overrrled in part by Brehm v. Eisner, 746
A.zd 244 (Del. 2000); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levein, 280 A.zd 717, 721-22 (Del. 1971) (finding
that the duty of loyalty did not apply since all shareholders received the same proportionate
dividend even though the court assumed that the board of the subsidiary paying the dividend
was entirely dominated by the parent).
38 See Marsh, supra note 9, at 63 ("A common example is the situation where a controlling
shareholder owns a large block of stock and, because of his tax bracket and the fact that he is
receiving a handsome salary, does not want to receive dividends; but a substantial amount of
stock is in the hands of the public.").
39 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 363 (Del. 1993), modified, 636 A.2d
956 (Del. 1994); Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 27 (Del. Ch. 2002). Materiality is found where
the benefit is significant enough "in the context of the director's economic circumstances,
as to have made it improbable that the director could perform her fiduciary duties to the...
shareholders without being influenced by her overriding personal interest." In re Gen. Motors
Class H S'holders Litig., 734 A.zd 6 11, 617 (Del. Ch. 2001) (citations omitted).
40 Thus, for example, in Kahn, the board of directors of Occidental approved expendi-
tures designed to construct a museum that would house the art collection of the CEO and
chairman of the board. See Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991). The court ignored the
non-pecuniary conflict of interest (by having the company fund the museum, the CEO ben-
efited by controlling the terms and circumstances of the artwork's display), and instead re-
viewed the transaction under the duty of care. See id.
41 See Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 466 n.14 (Del. 1991) (noting in dicta that "[a] court
will defer to the business judgment of outside directors that an interested transaction is fair
to the corporation"); In re Resorts Int'l S'holders Litig. Appeals, 570 A.2d 259, 266-67 (Del.
199o) (merger agreement "had been approved by an independent and disinterested special
committee and therefore would be accorded the presumption of the business judgment rule's
[Vol. 95
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The approach required a subtle but fundamental shift in the interpre-
tation of fiduciary obligations. The sine qua non of the business judgment
rule was no longer the absence of a conflict of interest 4 but the presence
of a "neutral decision making body. '4 3 Rather than defining "neutral" as
a board devoid of a conflict of interest, something that could be accom-
plished through elimination 44 or quarantine,45 the courts instead opted for a
standard that had nothing to do with the conflict itself.4 It was enough to
show that a majority of the directors were independent and disinterested.
47
application" (citations omitted)); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334,
1345 (Del. 1987) ("[T]he board's actions taken by a majority of independent directors, are en-
titled to the protection of the business judgment rule." (citations omitted)); In re Trans World
Airlines, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 9844, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 139, at *19 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21,
1988) ("Both the device of the special negotiating committee of disinterested directors and
the device of a merger provision requiring approval by a majority of disinterested sharehold-
ers, when properly employed, have the judicial effect of making the substantive law aspect
of the business judgment rule applicable and, procedurally, of shifting back to plaintiffs the
burden of demonstrating that such a transaction infringes upon rights of minority sharehold-
ers.").
42 See Lewis v. S. L. & E., Inc., 629 F2d 764, 769 (2d Cir. 198o) ("But the business judg-
ment rule presupposes that the directors have no conflict of interest.").
43 Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1170 (Del. 1995); see also Nixon
v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993) ("In business judgment rule cases, an essen-
tial element is the fact that there has been a business decision made by a disinterested and
independent corporate decisionmaker."); Oberly, 592 A.2d at 467 ("The key to upholding an
interested transaction is the approval of some neutral decision-making body.").
44 Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 366 n.35 ("Examples of techniques which can restrict the
influence an interested director may exert include: recusal of the interested director(s) from
participation in board meetings .... (citations omitted)).
45 A disinterested and independent committee would be one possible mechanism for
quarantining a conflict of interest. This has been the approach used, for example, in the
context of board consideration of derivative suits. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d
779, 786 (Del. 1981) ("We do not think that the interest taint of the board majority is per se
a legal bar to the delegation of the board's power to an independent committee composed of
disinterested board members. The committee can properly act for the corporation to move
to dismiss derivative litigation that is believed to be detrimental to the corporation's best
interest."). Whether the conflict could ever be eliminated, even with a rigorous quarantine,
remains an open question. See Marsh, supra note 9, at 37-38 (discussing early cases, found
that it was "impossible to measure the influence" of interested directors on the board and, as
a result, courts gave little weight to disinterested approval). Delaware, however, has rejected
this view. See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 363.
46 See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 363 ("This Court has never held that one director's color-
able interest in a challenged transaction is sufficient, without more, to deprive a board of the
protection of the business judgment rule presumption of loyalty.").
47 See Cinerama, Inc., 663 A.2d at 1170 n.25 ("A board of which a majority of directors is
interested is not a 'neutral decision-making body."' (citations omitted)); Nixon, 626 A.zd 1376
n.7 (independent corporate decisionmaker "could be a disinterested and independent major-
ity of the board of directors or the stockholders" (citation omitted)); Cal. Pub. Employees
Ret. Sys. v. Coulter, No. 19191, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 144, at *22 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2002)
("Furthermore, when a director's compensation is established by a majority of disinterested
directors, the business judgment rule applies to the decision." (footnote omitted)); Orman v.
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Directors with a conflict of interest could remain on the board, participate
in the decision, and vote on the final outcome without depriving the board
of its neutral status.
This approach reduced the concept of neutrality to a rote head count.
The analysis did not require any assessment of the qualitative impact of
the interested influence. A board with a majority of independent directors
was neutral, a board without was not.' A shift in the independence of a
single director could result in the application of radically different stan-
dards of review.
49
Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 22 (Del. Ch. 2002) ("To rebut successfully business judgment presump-
tions ... a plaintiff must normally plead facts demonstrating 'that a majority of the director
defendants have a financial interest in the transaction or were dominated or controlled by a
materially interested director."' (footnote omitted)); Crescent/Mach I Partners, LP v. Turner,
846 A.zd 963 (Del. Ch. 2000); see also McMichael v. U.S. Filter Corp., No. EDCV 99-182 VAP,
2001 US Dist. LEXIS 3918, at *44 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2001) ("To prevail on their breach of
loyalty claim, Plaintiffs must overcome the Business Judgment Rule presumption and show a
majority of the U.S. Filter Directors had personal interest potentially adverse to the interests
of U.S. Filter and its shareholders." (citation omitted) (applying Delaware law)); Cede & Co.,
634 A.zd at 363-64 ("Neither Aronson nor Pogostin can be fairly read to support Cinerama's
thesis that a finding of one director's possession of a disqualifying self-interest is sufficient,
without more, to rebut the business judgment presumption of director/board loyalty; and no
Delaware decisional law of this Court supports such a result.").
48 Majority meant majority, unless inconvenient. Evenly divided will not do; the inde-
pendent directors must be a majority. See Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc.
v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1o46 (Del. 2004) ("If three directors of a six person board are not
independent and three directors are independent, there is not a majority of independent di-
rectors and demand would be futile." (citation omitted)); see also Beneville v. York, 769 A.zd 8o,
86 (Del. Ch. zooo) (holding that demand is excused where a board is evenly divided between
interested and disinterested directors). On the other hand, Delaware courts have allowed
boards to create a disinterested majority through the use of recusals. See Ivanhoe Partners
v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1339 n.io (Del. 1987) (noting the deference to a
board that consisted of nine directors, with only four qualifying as independent. Because two
of the interested directors "recused" themselves, the court found that the four independent
directors constituted a majority).
49 For example, in In re Viacom, Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 235 N.Y.L.J.
126 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 23, 2006), plaintiffs challenged compensation in excess of $15o mil-
lion paid to three officers in a year when the company experienced losses in excess of $17
billion. With defendants conceding that five of the twelve directors were not independent,
the case turned upon whether plaintiffs could sufficiently allege facts showing that one ad-
ditional director had a disqualifying relationship. The court examined three directors and
their connections to the company, ultimately concluding that one might not be independent.
Id. at 11-12 ("The fact that [the director] advised [the CEO] in his personal affairs in two
large acquisitions, provided services and continues to provide services to Viacom is sufficient
to create a reasonable doubt as to his ability to evaluate plaintiffs' demand without a taint of
interest, 'extraneous considerations' or influences."). In other words, the continuation of the
case and the application of the duty of loyalty turned on the relationship of one director. Had
the director provided a little less personal advice to an executive, the case would have been
dismissed and the duty of loyalty rendered inapplicable.
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Citron v. Fairchilad' illustrates the high degree of interested influence
allowed in the decision-making process while still applying the business
judgment rule. The Fairchild Camera board consisted of ten persons,
including Wilfred Corrigan, the CEO, president, and chairman. After re-
ceiving an unsolicited takeover offer from Gould, Inc., Corrigan expressed
opposition and sought a white knight."' Schlumberger, Inc. surfaced as a
possible rescuer, with Corrigan participating in the negotiations and appar-
ently receiving a commitment that he would be retained "as president and
CEO".5" During the same period, he refused to meet with officials from
Gould53 and assisted the removal of a Fairchild director who was friends
with that company's chairman.M Ultimately, the board of Fairchild rejected
a higher offer from Gould, and accepted a lower one from Schlumberger.
The facts suggested a possible conflict of interest by Corrigan. He dem-
onstrated a hostile "animus" towards Gould and had expectations of contin-
ued post-merger employment with Schlumberger. Moreover, as the CEO,
president, and chairman, Corrigan presumably had considerable sway over
the other members of the board. He remained involved in various nego-
tiations and participated in the board meetings where key decisions were
made.
50 Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53 (Del. 1989).
51 Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., No. 6o85, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 67
(Del. Ch. May 19, 1988) ("Mr. Corrigan also expressed his own strong reservations about a
combination with Gould. In particular, he expressed concern that Fairchild personnel would
not fit into what he characterized, according to one witness, as a 'highly centralized monolithic
organization.' Corrigan clearly was not pleased by Gould's proposal."), aff'd, 569 A.zd 53 (Del.
1988). Corrigan's opposition caused the court to conclude that he "exhibit[ed] some animus
toward Gould." Citron, 569 A.zd at 65; see also id. ("He considered Gould a 'highly centralized
monolithic organization' and informed the other directors that he 'personally didn't want to
be part of such a combination."'). As the court described: "Corrigan expressed himself as
unequivocally opposed to Gould's proposal. Corrigan did not like what he had heard about
Gould." Id. at 57.
52 Citron, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 67, at *24. They also discussed Corrigan's future with
Schlumberger and the possibility of a position for him on the board. See id. ("After that
time period, according to Corrigan's testimony at trial, he told Riboud that the only circum-
stances under which he could visualize remaining were if he had a position as a director of
Schlumberger. Riboud responded, according to Corrigan's testimony, that although it was not
the appropriate time to discuss it, if things went well during the transition and if both sides
wanted Corrigan to remain, a directorship 'was in the cards."'). In his deposition, Corrigan
indicated that the promise of a board position was a "commitment." This was arguably even
more important given the original bidder's reputation for taking a "ruthless" approach to re-
placing existing management.
53 The chairman of Gould indicated a desire to meet with Corrigan. Corrigan refused for
"tactical" reasons. Id.
54 Citron, 569 A.zd at 58 ("The following day, May 4, at Fairchild's annual meeting, its
shareholders reelected all incumbent directors except Louis F Polk, Jr., who had not been
renominated due, in part, to Corrigan's displeasure with Polk's friendship with Ylvisaker [the
chairman of Gould, Inc.].")
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Corrigan's influence, however, remained largely irrelevant to the analy-
sis. The plaintiff's case was reduced to a rote count of the number of inde-
pendent and disinterested directors. With the majority deemed indepen-
dent, the court applied the business judgment rule, acting as if Corrigan's
opposition or influence did not exist. The standard obviated the board's
obligation to show fairness or to justify why it accepted the lower priced
offer.
5
3. Source of the Rule Eliminating Fairness.-Application of the business
judgment rule in cases like Fairchild is hard to justify 6 The source of the
approach has never been entirely explained. It seems to have arisen in part
from an inaccurate reading of section 144(a) of the Delaware Corporate
Code. 7
The provision provides that certain conflicts of interest are not "void
or voidable" where approved by the "affirmative votes of a majority of the
55 See In re The Ltd., Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 17148-NC, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 28, at
*28 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2002) (noting that the transaction benefited the CEO/Chairman and
largest shareholder; the court did not examine his influence on the negotiations, but required
plaintiff to show that a majority of directors were not independent and disinterested).
56 Despite pursuing the business judgment rule approach, however, courts have left
open the possibility that a plaintiff can show that an interested party exercised control over
independent directors. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345,364 (Del. 1994) ("We
agree with defendants that the question of when director self-interest translates into board
disloyalty is a fact-dominated question, the answer to which will necessarily vary from case
to case."), modified, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994); see also Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663
A.2d 1156, 117o n.25 (Del. 1995) ("Similarly, the manipulation of the disinterested majority by
an interested director vitiates the majority's ability to act as a neutral decision-making body."
(citation omitted)). Given obvious difficulties in proof and heightened pleading standards,
this rarely occurs. ButseeIn re LNR Prop. Corp. S'holders Litig., 896 A.2d 169 (Del Ch. 2005)
(refusing to dismiss suit against individual directors in which plaintiff made allegations that
controlling shareholder negotiated the terms of the merger).
57 The provision by its terms does not require approval by disinterested shareholders.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § i44(a) (zoo6). Nonetheless, it is often cited for the proposition.
See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 366 n.34 ("Under this statute, approval of an interested transac-
tion by either a fully-informed disinterested board of directors, 8 Del. C. § i44(a)(i), or the
disinterested shareholders, 8 Del. C. § i44(a)(2), provides business judgment protection." (ci-
tation omitted)); Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.zd 400,405 n.3 (Del. 1987) ("On the other hand,
approval by fully-informed disinterested directors under section i44(a)(i), or disinterested
stockholders under section i44(a)(2), permits invocation of the business judgment rule and
limits judicial review to issues of gift or waste with the burden of proof upon the party at-
tacking the transaction."). The reference has been repeated more recently. See Rosser v. New
Valley Corp., No. 17 272-NC, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, at *17 n.23 (Del. Ch. May 27, 2005).
But see In re Cysive, Inc. S'holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531,550 n.23 (Del. Ch. 2003) (citing section
144 for the proposition that merger is not voidable if "approved by a majority of disinterested
directors or a majority of disinterested stockholders."). For a discussion of the mistaken inter-
pretation, see J. Robert Brown, Jr., Speaking with Complete Candor: Shareholder Ratification and
the Elimination of the Duty of Loyaly, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 641 (2003).
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disinterested directors..."" A number of courts have relied on the laguage
to justify the application of the business judgment rule,59 apparently con-
cluding that the approval mechanism somehow removes the "taint" of the
conflict of interest.'
This interpretation is wrong for a number of reasons. Most noticeably,
section 144(a) addresses voidability, 61 not the standard of review for a non-
58 § i44(a); seealso Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 891 A.2d 15o, 185 (Del. Ch.
2005) ("Satisfying the requirements of § 144 only means that the BFC Transaction is not void
or voidable solely because of the conflict of interest."), aff'd, 906 A.2d 114 (Del. 2006); HMG/
Courtland Props., Inc. v. Gray, 749 A.2d 94, 114 n.24 (Del. Ch. 1999) ("Rather, satisfaction of
§§ i 44(a)(i) or (a)(z) simply protects against invalidation of the transaction solely because it is
an interested one." (citation omitted)).
59 The observation was made in Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.zd 445, 466 (Del. 1991) ("First,
section 144 allows a committee of disinterested directors to approve a transaction and bring it
within the scope of the business judgment rule."). The case neither involved a transaction un-
der section 144 nor a for-profit corporation. Nonetheless, in Cinerama, Inc., 663 A.2d i 156, the
Delaware Supreme Court extended the doctrine to the traditional corporate area. The opinion
noted: "In Oberly, even though Section i44(a) did not apply to the action being contested,
this Court relied upon the provisions in that statute to illustrate the general principle that, as
to the duty of loyalty, approval of a transaction by a board of which a majority of directors is
disinterested and independent 'brings it within the scope of the business judgment rule."' Id.
at 1170 (citation omitted); see also Kahn ex rel DeKalb Genetics Corp. v. Roberts, No. 12324,
1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 151, at *13 (Del. Ch. Dec. 6, 1995) ("The business judgment rule will
shelter a transaction from shareholder challenge if a panel of independent directors approves
it. 8 Del. C. § 144(a)") (footnote and citations omitted), aff'd, 679 A.2d 460 (Del. 1996); Cede
& Co., 634 A.ad at 366 n.34 ("[Slection 144 removes the "interested director cloud" from a
transaction through three alternative methods and permits an otherwise interested transac-
tion to be brought within the protection of the business judgment rule." (citations omitted)).
As recently as 2003, the Delaware Supreme Court cited Section i44 (and Aronson) for the
proposition that the business judgment rule applied unless a majority of the directors were
interested in the transaction. See Krasner v. Moffett, 826 A.2d 277, 287 n.39 (Del. zoo3). Other
courts have repeated the position. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Aust (In re
Network Access Solutions Corp. & NASOP Inc.), 330 B.R. 67, 78 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005) ("The
decision of a majority of the disinterested directors to execute a transaction with an interested
director is subject to the business judgment rule." (citation omitted)).
6o See Nebenzahl v. Miller, No. 13206, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS I 13, at *'o-i 1 (Del. Ch.
Aug. 26, 1996) ("Compliance with Section 144 provides the protection of the business judg-
ment rule and removes the taint of director self-interest in a transaction." (citations omitted));
see also Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 365 ("Section 144(a)(i) appears to be a legislative mandate
that, under such circumstances, an approving vote of a majority of informed and disinterested
directors shall remove any taint of director or directors' self-interest in a transaction." (citation
omitted)).
61 So the general rule seems to be with these types of statutes. See Bruce A. McGovern,
Fiduciary Duties, Consolidated Returns, and Fairness, 81 NEB. L. REv. 170, 187 (2002) ("The
courts, however, generally have viewed such statutes as displacing only the common law's
original rule that directors' self-dealing transactions were automatically voidable." (footnote
omitted)); see also Oberhelman v. Barnes Inv. Corp., 690 P.2d 1343, 1349-5 o (Kan. 1984) (find-
ing that under KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6304, which is identical to DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 144,
approval by disinterested directors does not preclude review for fairness) (citing Fliegler v.
Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976)). Thus, it is not quite right to say that there is near una-
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voidable transactions. 6 Nothing in the language or the purpose of the pro-
vision compels application of the business judgment rule.63 Moreover, the
structure of the provision militates against any such interpretation. In addi-
tion to disinterested directors, section 144(a) permits approval by all share-
holders (not just disinterested ones). Using a consistent logic, transactions
authorized by shareholders (even where the interested party owns a major-
ity) would be subject to the business judgment rule, an absurd position that
is not accepted by the courts.64
The absence of a logical rationale for this position has resulted in incon-
sistent application. The business judgment rule does not apply to transac-
tions between a company and a controlling shareholder, 65 even if approved
nimity on applying the business judgment rule in the case of approval by a board with a
majority of disinterested directors. But see Dennis J. Block, Stephen A. Radin & Michael J.
Maimone, Derivative Litigation: Current Law Versus the American Law Institute, 48 Bus. LAW.
1443, 1443-44 (1993) ("[Clourts both in and out of Delaware have ruled with near unanim-
ity... that the business judgment rule is the appropriate standard of judicial review in cases
where an independent majority of a corporation's board of directors determines that litigation
on behalf of the corporation will not serve the best interests of the corporation.").
62 Similar statutes exist in most states. In general, they have not been interpreted to
eliminate fairness from the analysis. See Marsh, supra note 9, at 46-47; William W. Bratton, Se/f-
Regulation, Normative Choice, and the Structure of Corporate Fiduciary Law, 61 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
1084, io88 (1993) ("They have consistently construed them to permit direct judicial review
for fairness despite disinterested-director approval." (footnote omitted)).
63 Thus, as one Delaware court has noted, the true source of the requirement is common
law. See In re Cox Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 614-15 (Del. Ch. 2005) ("§
I44 has been interpreted as dealing solely with the problem of per se invalidity; that is, as
addressing only the common law principle that interested transactions were entirely invalid
and providing a road map for transactional planners to avoid that fate. The somewhat different
question of when an interested transaction might give rise to a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty-i.e., to a claim in equity-was left to the common law of corporations to answer. Mere
compliance with § 144 did not necessarily suffice." (footnote omitted)).
64 In a case decided just before the adoption of section 144, the Delaware Supreme
Court reaffirmed that approval by "disinterested" shareholders merely shifted the burden
of showing fairness. See Alcott v. Hyman, 2o8 A.zd 501, 505 (Del. 1965); see also In re Cox
Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., 879 A.2d at 615 ("By its own terms, Section 144 alleviates the
possibility of per se invalidity by a vote of stockholders, without any explicit requirement that
a majority of the disinterested stockholders approve. The common law, by contrast, only gives
ratification effect to approval of the interested transaction by a majority of the disinterested
stockholders." (footnotes omitted)). In fact, the MBCA originally contained similar language
concerning shareholder approval but specifically excluded the votes of the interested director.
See Sobek v. Stonitsch, 995 F Supp. 918,92o (N.D. Ill. 1998). For a discussion of this anomaly,
see Liston v. Gottsegen (In re Mi-Lor Corp.), 348 F3d 294 (ist Cir. 2003).
65 Courts sometimes add "or dominating" to the category of shareholders subject to the
standards. See Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., 638 A.zd 1110, 1117 (Del. I994) ("Once again,
this Court holds that the exclusive standard of judicial review in examining the propriety of
an interested cash-out merger transaction by a controlling or dominating shareholder is entire
fairness." (citation omitted)); see also In re PNB Holding Co. S'holders Litig., No. 28-N, 2006
Del. Ch. LEXIS 158, at *30 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, zoo6) ("Remember that the Delaware case
law in this area (that is, the Lynch line of jurisprudence) has been premised on the notion that
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by a board containing a majority of independent and disinterested direc-
tors.66 Instead, companies are obligated to remove the interested influence
from the decision-making process through the use of a special commit-
tee.67 Even then, the decisions do not receive the presumption of fairness
contained in the business judgment rule,' but merely shifts the burden to
the shareholders to show a lack of fairness.69 Thus, in the case of a control-
when a controller wants the rest of the shares, the controller's power is so potent that inde-
pendent directors and minority stockholders cannot freely exercise their judgment, fearing
retribution from the controller. For this reason (which is in great tension with other aspects of
our law), the jurisprudence has required that such transactions always be subject to fairness
review." (footnotes omitted)).
66 See In re LNR Prop. Corp. S'holders Litig., 896 A.2d 169, 177 (Del. Ch. 2005) ("[T]he
business judgment rule does not protect the board's decision to approve a merger (even where
a majority of the directors are independent and disinterested) where a controlling shareholder
has a conflicting self-interest.").
67 See William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function Over Form: A
Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 Bus. LAW. 1287, 1308 (200)
("We recognize that the integrity of the special disinterested director committee process re-
mains subject to debate. The argument against according that process business judgment
review is that although most public company boards have a majority of independent directors,
those directors are not hermetically sealed off from the inside directors. It is commonplace for
outside directors to have social, and in some cases business, relationships (e.g., a partner in the
company's outside law firm or investment bank serving as a director). That reality may explain
the Delaware Supreme Court's reluctance to give the special committee device full credit as
a cleansing mechanism. It may also provide a basis for withholding full ratification effect to
board approval of transactions achieved in that fashion.").
68 See In re Cysive, Inc., S'holder Litig., 836 A.2d 531 (Del. Ch. 2003); In re Trans World
Airlines, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 9844, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 139, at *2o (Del. Ch. Oct.
21, 1988) (declaring that approval by independent negotiating committee results in "burden
shifting effect" with respect to "the entire fairness of the transaction"). This is true whether
disinterested approval is by directors or shareholders. See In re LNR Prop. Corp. S'holders Litig.,
896 A.2d at 178 n.52 ("While the initial burden of establishing entire fairness rests on the
defendant party, an approval of the transaction by an independent and disinterested board
or Special Committee, as well as an informed majority of minority vote, shifts the burden of
proof on the issue of fairness to the challenging shareholder plaintiffs."); Rosser v. New Valley
Corp., No. 17272-NC, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, at *i8 (Del. Ch. May 27, 2005) ("On the other
hand, if implementation of the Plan is considered to be the result of actions taken by a control-
ling shareholder group, the effect of approval by fully informed and disinterested sharehold-
ers may simply be to shift to the Plaintiff the burden of demonstrating that the transaction
was not entirely fair."). A recent court, however, suggested that the appropriate standard of
review for a recommendation by a special committee might be an open question. See Krasner
v Moffett, 826 A.2d 277, 286 (Del. 2003) ("Beyond that, it is premature to determine the legal
effect-and the resulting standard of review-that would apply if a special committee that
operated independently recommended a merger to the full board.").
69 One chancery court opinion has suggested applying the business judgment rule
where approved by both disinterested directors and shareholders. See In re Cox Commc'ns,
Inc. S'holders Litig., 879 A.2d at 606 ("The reform would be to invoke the business judgment
rule standard of review when a going private merger with a controlling stockholder was ef-
fected using a process that mirrored both elements of an arms-length merger: i) approval by
disinterested directors; and z) approval by disinterested stockholders. The two elements are
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ling shareholder, fairness remains an element of the claim, albeit with the
obligation on the plaintiffs.
The courts have never provided an adequate explanation for the dif-
fering standards.70 Cases involving short-form mergers suggested that the
business purpose of the transaction had no place in the analysis,71 a view
some have criticized." Others indicated a concern about possible retalia-
tion by the controlling shareholder.73 As one court explained:
[M]ergers with controlling stockholders involve an extraordinary potential
for the exploitation by powerful insiders of their informational advantages
and their voting clout. Facing the proverbial 800 pound gorilla who wants
the rest of the bananas all for himself, chimpanzees like independent di-
rectors and disinterested stockholders could not be expected to make sure
that the gorilla paid a fair price. Therefore, the residual protection of an
unavoidable review of the financial fairness whenever plaintiffs could raise
a genuine dispute of fact about that issue was thought to be a necessary final
protection. 74
complementary and not substitutes.").
70 See also In re W. Nat'l Corp. S'holders Litig., No. 15927, 2ooo Del. Ch. LEXIS 82,
at *87-88 (Del. Cb. May 22, 2000) ("The policy rationale requiring some variant of entire
fairness review, to my mind, substantially, if not entirely, abates if the transaction in ques-
tion involves a large though not controlling shareholder. In other words, because the absence
of a controlling shareholder removes the prospect of retaliation, the business judgment rule
should apply to an independent special committee's good faith and fully informed recom-
mendation." (footnote omitted)).
71 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983) ("[Wle do not believe that any
additional meaningful protection is afforded minority shareholders by the business purpose
requirement of the trilogy of Singer, Tanzer, Najjar, and their progeny. Accordingly, such re-
quirement shall no longer be of any force or effect." (footnotes and citation omitted)); see also
Kahn v. Lynch Commc'ns Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d i i io (Del. 1994); In re W Nat'l Corp., 2000 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 82, at *78-79.
72 As one court noted: "That is an odd and unsatisfying rationale, which, if taken seri-
ously, would have implications for all decisions by directors who agree to cash mergers." In re
Cox Commc'ns, 879 A.2d at 617.
73 See In re Cox Commc'ns, Inc., S'holders Liig., 879 A.zd at 616 ("Their fear that the con-
troller would retaliate against a negative vote, Vice Chancellor Jacobs suggested, rendered
a Minority Approval Condition an insufficient guarantee of fairness in this unique transac-
tional context to give that vote ratification effect." (footnote omitted)); see also In re Cysive,
Inc., S'holderLitig., 836 A.2d at 548 ("The rationale for this rule is that the potential power of
the controlling stockholder to act in ways that are detrimental to independent directors and
unaffiliated stockholders is supposedly so formidable that the law's prohibition of retributive
action and unfair self-dealing is insufficient to render either independent director or indepen-
dent stockholder approval a reliable guarantee of fairness." (footnote omitted)).
74 In re Cox Commc'ns, Inc., S'holders Litig., 879 A.2d at 617 (footnote omitted); see also In
eTele-Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 16470, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS zo6, at *25-26 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 21, zoo5 ) (applying the burden shifting approach in a case "evaluating transactions
between the corporation and a third party when the directors of the corporation (and the affili-
ates of such directors) own significant non-majority stakes of the corporation's voting shares
[Vol. 95
ELIMINATING THE DUTY OF LOYALTY
The court correctly noted that a special committee did not automati-
cally eliminate the interested influence but incorrectly limited the observa-
tion to a controlling shareholder.75 The same rationale can also apply in the
case of an "imperial" CEO.76 Moreover, even if a controlling shareholder
somehow presented a greater risk of influence, that would not automati-
cally justify a lower standard for interested directors. The opaqueness of
the reasoning has caused at least one court to question the approach." In
fact, the distinction is probably not analytical but historical.78
4. Summary.-The courts have never provided an adequate justification
for applying the business judgment rule to a conflict of interest transac-
tion approved by a board that contains a majority of independent directors.
Section 144(a) does not, as some courts have suggested, compel applying
the outcome. Nor does it result from expungement of the conflict. In fact,
the approach makes no effort to ensure that a decision-making process is
free of the conflict of interest. 9 The result is to use the business judgment
and have personal interests that significantly diverge from those of other equity holders" in-
volving significant non-majority stakes (footnote omitted)). Commentators have criticized
the view that transactions with controlling shareholders are inherently coercive or susceptible
to retaliation. See Peter V. Letsou & Steven M. Haas, The Dilemma That Should Never Have
Been: Minority Freeze Outs in Delaware, 61 Bus. LAw. 25 (2005).
75 As a structural matter, courts have expressed a preference for a multi-member com-
mittee. See Gesoff v. IIC Indus., 9o2 A.zd 1130, 1146 (Del. Ch. zoo6) ("The court necessarily
places more trust in a multiple-member committee than a committee where a single member
works free of the oversight provided by at least one colleague." (footnote omitted)).
76 Eisner's control of the Disney board is a good example. See discussion infra Part V.
77 See In re Cox Commc'ns, Inc., S'holders Litig., 879 A.zd 604; see also Allen, Jacobs & Strine,
Jr., supra note 67, at 1307 ("Also strained is the rationale for not giving full ratification effect to
approval by a genuinely effective special committee of independent directors.").
78 The courts addressed the impact of independent decision making in l7einberger, a case
decided in 1983. See generally, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 70i (Del. 1983). In that
opinion, the court largely locked itself into the view that the use of an independent committee
did not result in the application of the business judgment rule. See id. at 709 n.7 ("Particularly
in a parent-subsidiary context, a showing that the action taken was as though each of the
contending parties had in fact exerted its bargaining power against the other at arm's length
is strong evidence that the transaction meets the test of fairness." (citations omitted)); see also
Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 1985) ("However, approval of a merger,
as here, by an informed vote of a majority of the minority shareholders, while not a legal pre-
requisite, shifts the burden of proving the unfairness of the merger entirely to the plaintiffs."
(citation omitted)). Thus, the doctrine was largely fixed in the i98os. It was not until the 199os
that the Delaware courts conclusively found that approval by independent directors results in
the application of the business judgment rule. See supra notes 46, 47. By then, however, the
court was stuck with a different position with respect to controlling shareholders.
79 The court in Aronson noted the arbitrary nature of the majority requirement. See
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 n.8 (Del. 1984) ("We recognize that drawing the line at
a majority of the board may be an arguably arbitrary dividing point. Critics will charge that
we are ignoring the structural bias common to corporate boards throughout America, as well
as the other unseen socialization processes cutting against independent discussion and deci-
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rule to insulate the board from challenges to actions motivated not by risk-
taking but by a desire to benefit an interested party.
III. INDEPENDENCE AND THE BOARD
A. Independence Defined
That disinterested approval will somehow protect the corporation from the
risks of self-dealing has been labeled by some as an abject failure. 0 Early
cases suggested that disinterested approval was an impossible goal.s' Be-
cause of human nature, directors may find it impossible to act in a truly
unbiased fashion when considering transactions that benefit their brethren
on the board."2
Even assuming that disinterested approval is attainable, however, the
approach presumes a rigorous attempt to ensure that those making the de-
cision are in fact independent. Independence requires that decisions be
"based on the corporate merits of the subject ... rather than extraneous
considerations or influences."' In other words, "the end result ... must be
that each director has brought his or her own informed business judgment
sionmaking in the boardroom. The difficulty with structural bias in a demand futile case is
simply one of establishing it in the complaint for purposes of Rule 23.1. We are satisfied that
discretionary review by the Court of Chancery of complaints alleging specific facts pointing
to bias on a particular board will be sufficient for determining demand futility."), overruled in
part by Brehm v. Eisner, 74 6 A.2d 244 (Del. 2ooo). Aronson was a demand excusal case. There,
the requirement of a majority of independent directors meant that the board would have suffi-
cient persons who could manage and make decisions about the litigation. The same reasoning
does not apply, however, to the approval of conflict of interest transactions. There is no need
to "manage" the transaction. The only issue is whether approval was neutral and therefore
free of the interested taint. The majority requirement does not ensure this.
8o See Marsh, supra note 9, at 54 ("[I1t can be asserted with some assurance that the
requirement of approval by a disinterested majority of the board of directors was an abject fail-
ure."). Others have noted the practical difficulty in determining independence. See Donald
C. Clarke, Setting the Record Straight: Three Concepts of the Independent Director, 32 DEL. J. CORP.
L. (forthcoming 2oo6) (manuscript at 28, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=892o37) ("The
second issue is that of effectiveness. Here the question is whether, given the many and subtle
ties that may exist between nominees and company management, independence can really
be ascertained in the abstract on the basis of paper submissions by management, and whether
independence so ascertained is really very meaningful.").
8i Later cases have suggested that as well. See, e.g. Bergstein v. Tex. Int'l Co., 453 A.2d
467,470 (Del. Ch. 1982) ("The Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has expressed the opin-
ion that a director who maintains a working relationship with other directors can never be
truly independent." (citation omitted)).
8z See Gelb, supra note 35, at 135 ("Yet, even the platonic disinterested or independent
director may lack the intelligence, courage, desire, time, character, communicative skill, or
knowledge to carefully scrutinize, stand against, or influence others with respect to self-deal-
ing transactions.").
83 Aronson, 473 A.zd at 816.
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to bear with specificity upon the corporate merits of the issues without
regard for or succumbing to influences which convert an otherwise valid
business decision into a faithless act."
' 4
Although broadly stated, the test has been applied in an excessively
narrow and often inconsistent fashion. Resolution turns almost exclusively
on control. Directors under the domination of an interested director will
not be treated as independent."5 Yet, control has not engendered a broad,
holistic examination of the relationships among directors. Instead, it has
meant little more than the possible loss of a material stream of income,
6
with other types of non-motivations receiving little consideration."'
B. Materiality
Independence is lost most readily through financial leverage when the
interested party can terminate a material stream of income.88 In defining
"material," courts eschew an objective formulation 9 and instead rely on
a subjective, actual person standard;90 one that requires an "independent
84 Id.
85 See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 117o n.25 (Del. 1995) ("A ma-
jority of disinterested directors is not "independent" if that majority was dominated by an
interested director." (citation omitted)).
86 Although the Delaware Supreme Court has belatedly recognized friendship as an-
other possible basis for loss of independence, the test will not result in serious examination of
the relationships as a possible source of bias. See infra notes 142-48 and accompanying text.
87 See infra note 137 and accompanying text. Thus, for example, facts tending to show
that directors often sided with the interested party will not suffice. See Khanna v. McMinn,
No. 205 45-NC, 2oo6 Del. Ch. LEXIS 86, at *58 n.9z (Del. Ch. May 9, zoo6) ("Although there
may be instances in which a director's voting history would be sufficient to negate a director's
presumed independence, routine consensus cannot suffice to demonstrate disloyalty on the
part of a director.").
88 Some courts have required that the power to terminate a material income stream be
unilateral. See Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 891 A.zd 150, 177 (Del. Ch. 2005)
("This Court will not find a director beholden unless the purported controlling person has
'unilateral' power to substantially affect the director." (footnote omitted)), aff'd, 906 A.zd
114 (Del. 2oo6). The decisions in this area have not, however, been consistent. See Ales v.
Blasband, 634 A.zd 927, 937 (Del. 1993) ("Although Sherman's continued employment and
substantial remuneration may not hinge solely on his relationship with the Rales brothers,
there is little doubt that Steven Rales's position as Chairman of the Board of Danaher and
Mitchell Rales's position as Chairman of its Executive Committee place them in a position to
exert considerable influence over Sherman."). The need for unilateral authority is a rote ap-
proach that completely ignores the probable influence of someone in a position of authority.
89 See Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1167; see also Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.zd 5, 24 (Del. Ch.
2002) ("[Tlhe Delaware Supreme Court has rejected an objective 'reasonable director' test
and instead requires the application of a subjective 'actual person' standard to determine
whether aparricular director's interest is material and debilitating...." (footnote omitted)).
90 Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1167 ("The Court of Chancery reasoned that the logical alterna-
tive was a subjective "actual person" standard. We agree. The subjective standard is consis-
tent with this Court's observation, in Cede II, that requiring a shareholder plaintiff to show 'the
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judicial determination regarding the materiality of the 'given'director's self-
interest."'"
Whatever the wisdom of the approach, a subjective standard has con-
siderable practical implications. To show materiality, plaintiffs must es-
tablish the unique financial circumstances of each director. Logically, very
wealthy directors would almost always be independent, with most income
streams immaterial. Conversely, those of very modest means would lose
their independence upon receipt of any significant payment, including di-
rectors' fees.
In fact, the courts have not applied the materiality analysis in a consis-
tent fashion. The courts have used the subjective standard almost exclu-
sively to broaden, rather than narrow, the category of directors considered
independent, routinely finding significant streams of income immaterial.
Ordinary directors' fees do not result in a loss of independence, despite
modest income or net worth. 9
Materiality cases fall into two broad categories: direct and indirect pay-
ments. Direct payments are those made to the director, including salaries,
fees, and payments under consulting or other agreements. Indirect pay-
ments are those made to another entity-including clients, suppliers, or
charities-in which the director has a position of control or otherwise ben-
efits from the payments.
1. Direct payments.-With respect to employee salaries, courts generally
"assume" materiality 93 because of the traditional importance of the rela-
tionship.94 The courts have, however, created exceptions without much
materiality of a director's self-interest to the given director's independence' was a 'restatement
of established Delaware law."' (citation omitted)).
91 Id. at 1167.
92 See infra notes 103-1o and accompanying text.
93 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Servs. v. Elkins,
No. 20228-NC, 2oo4 Del. Ch. LEXIS 122, at *42 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2004) ("Although the
Complaint does not allege that Silverman's position [as CEO of a subsidiary] was material to
his financial well-being or that Silverman served at Elkins's pleasure, I will assume, without
deciding, that he lacked independence from Eikins."); seealso Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927,
937 (Del. 1993) ("Because of their alleged substantial financial interest in maintaining their
employment positions, there is a reasonable doubt that these two directors are able to consider
impartially an action that is contrary to the interests of the Rales brothers."); Zimmerman v.
Braddock, No. 184 73-NC, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 135, at *44 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, zoo5) (CEO
"handsomely compensated"), rev'd, 906 A.2d 776 (Del. 2oo6); In re The Ltd., Inc. S'holders
Litig., No. 17148-NC, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS z8, *21 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, zooz) ("It is reasonable
to infer that compensation of this magnitude [$1.8 million a year] is material to him.").
94 See Friedman v. Beningson, No. 12232, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 154 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4,
1995); seealso Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Coulter, No. 19191, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 144,
at *32 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2002) ("Coulter's position as White's superior alone would be suf-
ficiently material to give reason to doubt White's independence from Coulter."); In r TheLtd.,
Inc. S'holders Litig., 2002 Del. Ch. z8, at *20-23.
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analysis. Thus, a director receiving a "substantial salary" " did not lose his
independence where he also owned a sizable block of stock. The court
made the determination without discussing the salary, the number of shares
actually owned' or the impact of the decision on share prices.
97
Payments made pursuant to consulting agreements are treated with less
consistency than salaries. One court considered consulting fees equal to
twenty-two percent of a director's annual salary material, particularly when
coupled with fees.98 Other courts treated large payments ($75,00099 and
$150,000"°) as material even without proof of the director's income.' 0' At
the same time, courts have held similar amounts to be immaterial. 02
95 According to the proxy statement for the February 1998 meeting, Roy Disney was
paid $500,000 in salary and $700,000 in bonus. See WALT DISNEY CO., PROXY STATEMENT 15
(1998).
96 The court reported the total number owned by the entire Disney family. Ste infra
note 2o. The number of shares actually owned by Roy Disney was less, a number apparently
available to the court. See WALT DISNEY Co., PROXY STATEMENT, 2 (1998).
97 As the court concluded, "[tihe only reasonable inference that I can draw.., is that he is
an economically rational individual whose priority is to protect the value of his Disney shares,
not someone who would intentionally risk his own and his family's interests in order to placate
Eisner." In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 356 (Del. Ch. 1998), aff'd
in parr, rev'd in part sub nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.zd 244 (Del. 2000). The "only reason-
able inference" apparently meant that Roy Disney valued some slight shift in share prices
resulting from the overpayment to Ovitz more than his "substantial salary." Remarkably, the
court was able to determine this without any quantification of the consequences or allowing
plaintiff any discovery on the issue.
98 In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 16415, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70,
at *123-24 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004). The payments were on top of the $30,000 paid in directors
fees. Id.
99 Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 30 (Del. Ch. 2002) ("Even though there is no bright-
line dollar amount at which consulting fees received by a director become material,... I think
it is reasonable to infer that $75,000 would be material .... ").
too In reThe Ltd., Inc., S'holders Litig. No. 171 4 8-NC, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 28, at *23
(Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2002) ("I am satisfied that it is reasonable to infer from these allegations
that continued annual compensation [in the form of consulting fees] in excess of $150,000
would be material...."); see also Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422,430 (Del. 1997) (find-
ing that director was not independent where three years before he had received $1o,ooo per
month and more than $325,000 in bonuses).
ioi See In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holdetrsLiig., 2oo4 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70 at *125
("As of mid-1997, Muoio was on an annual $200,000 retainer for providing banking/financial
advisory services, and he viewed Prosser as a source of additional future lucrative consulting
fees." (citations omitted)); see also Krasner v. Moffett, 8z6 A.2d 277, 283 (Del. 2003) ("Latiolais
and Wohleber allegedly received substantial income from other entities within the interlock-
ing directorates of Freeport-McMoRan companies and arguably had an interest in appeasing
the MOXY and FSC insiders who also served with Latiolais and Wohleber on the boards of
other Freeport companies." (footnote omitted)); In re Ply Gem Indus., Inc. S'holders Litig.,
No. 15779-NC, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 84, at *33-34 (Del. Ch. June 26, 2001) (holding that rea-
sonable basis exists to question a director's independence when that director receives $91,ooo
in consulting fees).
102 See White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 552 n.24 (Del. 2001) (finding that consulting fees
2006-2007]
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The rule for ordinary directors' fees is categorical; they are not mate-
rial. 103 In effect, courts ignore their own standard of subjective materiality
and replace it with a mandatory rule holding that "usual and customary"
114
fees will not impair a director's neutrality.05 This is true irrespective of
the actual amount paid, which can be considerable, 106 or the net worth of
the particular director involved. 107 Nor, as a practical matter, do the courts
of $75,000 and $50,000 did not result in a loss of independence); Highland Legacy Ltd. v.
Singer, No. 1566-N, 2oo6 Del. Ch. LEXIS 55, at *22-23 (Del. Ch. Mar. 17, 2oo6) (noting fee
of $1o,ooo per month; "Moreover, the complaint does not even allege that these fees were
unusually large or material to Goldsmith or Steele." (footnote omitted)); In re The Walt Disney
Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 360 (holding that director receiving $50,000 in consulting fees
did not lose independence), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244
(Del. 2000).
103 Grobow v. Perot, S39 A.2d I8o, 188 (Del. 1988), overruled in part by Brehm v. Eisner,
746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); In re The Ltd., Inc. S'holders Litig., 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS z8 at *17;
see also A.R. Demarco Enters. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., No. 19133-NC, 2002 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 135, at *17 (Del. Ch. Nov. 26, 2002) ("It is well established in Delaware law that ordi-
nary director compensation alone is not enough to show demand futility." (footnote omitted));
Orman, 794 A.zd at 29 n.62. But see In re Gen. Motors (Hughes) S'holder Litig., No. 20269,
2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 65, at *6 n.7 (Del. Ch. May 4, 2005) ("The Complaint does allege that
Pfeiffer and Bryan are "professional directors" and that they derive "substantial income" from
serving on various boards of directors, but the Complaint does not allege that the income re-
ceived from GM is material to them." (citation omitted)), aff'd, 897 A.2d 162 (Del. 2006).
io4 In re Nat'l Auto Credit, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 19028, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 5, at
*39 (Del. Ch. Jan. IO, 2003).
105 See id. at *39-40. This is true whether the fees are from the parent or a subsidiary. See
In re The Ltd., Inc. S'holders Litig., 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 28 at O18-I9 ("Similarly, the receipt
of director's fees from a subsidiary does not, in the absence of other facts suggesting a lack of
independence, demonstrate a reasonable doubt as to that director's loyalty." (footnote omit-
ted)).
io6 See In re Gen. Motors (Hughes) S'holderLitig., 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 65, at *5 n.5 (noting
that directors paid annual retainer of $2oo,ooo per year, reimbursement for travel expenses, and
other compensation valued by plaintiffs at $17,000 per year; chair of audit committee receives
an annual retainer of $30,0oo per year; committee's other members receive an annual retainer
of $20,000 per year); Ted Pincus, Bank One, J.P Morgan Name 8 Members Each to New Board,
CHI. SuN-TIMES, May 4, 2004, at 59 ("They will be paid what J.P. Morgan Chase directors are
currently paid: a minimum of $75,ooo annually, plus a grant of stock worth $170,000 the day of
the grant. Directors who are chairmen of special committees receive an additional $15,ooo a
year."); Id. ("Bank One directors are paid a minimum $60,000 annual retainer plus stock grants
worth at least $6o,ooo to non-employees, according to a regulatory filing last month."). For
a discussion of the fees paid to directors in the Fortune 1oo, see SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP,




107 Thus, the principal of the elementary school in Disney was held to be independent
despite the likely materiality of the fees. See In rr The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d
at 359-6o. The analytically inconsistent approach has caused courts to consider other meth-
ods of rendering fees irrelevant. A number of recent cases have concluded that it does not
matter even if the fees are material because an interested director lacks the unilateral author-
[Vol. 95
ELIMINATING THE DUTY OF LOYALTY
examine fees in conjunction with other payments." 8 Only where the pay-
ments climbed to astronomical levels' 9 or were increased as a quid pro
quo'"' were they found to impair independence.
Courts have justified the rule concerning fees by asserting that to do
otherwise would result in all directors being "deemed biased""' or would
allow only wealthy individuals to sit on the board."' Neither explanation
icy to dismiss an independent director, emphasizing that nominations are done by committee
and approved by shareholders. See In ne J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. S'holder Litig., 906 A.zd
8o8, 821 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff'd sub nom. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. S'holder Litig. v. Harrison,
906 A.2d 766 (Del. 2oo6) ("Harrison cannot fire any of [the directors]. Additionally, Harrison
is not a controlling stockholder of JPMC and therefore has no power to oust them as directors
through a stockholder vote. On the contrary, it is the eleven outside directors who collectively
have the power to dismiss Harrison and the rest of his management team."); Jacobs v. Yang,
No. 2o6-N, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 117, at *16 (Del. Ch. Aug. 2,2004), aff'd, 2005 Del. LEXIS
38 (Del. Jan. 21, 2005) ("In addition, the board has a nominating committee comprised of non-
employee directors who recommend board candidates. The nominating committee ensures
that the Insider Defendants (particularly Yang) are incapable of controlling a director's nomi-
nation, election and continued tenure on Yahool's board."). The approach, of course, ignores
the traditional degree of control held by a CEO over board membership. See In re The Walt
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 706-6I (Del. Ch. 2005), aff'dsub noma. Brehm v.
Eisner 906 A.2d 27 (Del. zoo6) ("Eisner stacked his (and I intentionally write 'his' as opposed
to 'the Company's') board of directors with friends and other acquaintances who, though not
necessarily beholden to him in a legal sense, were certainly more willing to accede to his
wishes and support him unconditionally than truly independent directors." (footnote omit-
ted)); Citron v. Fairchild Camera Instrument Corp., 569 A.zd 53, S8 (Del. 1989) (noting that
director who earned CEO's "displeasure" was not renominated).
1o8 Thus, in In re The Ltd., Inc. SholdersLitig., 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS z8, at 18-19, the di-
rector apparently received fees for sitting on the board of the parent and on a subsidiary. The
court examined each in isolation and determined that fees alone were insufficient to result
in control. Butsee In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc., S'holders Litig., No. 16415, 2004 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 7o , at *126-27 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004) ("That expectation [to continue as directors],
coupled with the fact that his director and committee fees represented a sizeable portion of
his income, was sufficient to vitiate Vondras' independence for purposes of considering objec-
tively whether the Privatization was fair to the minority stockholders.").
1o9 See In re eBay S'holders Litig., No. 19988-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 4, at * I (Del.
Ch. Feb. 11, 2004) ("Given that the value of the options for Cook (and allegedly for the other
outside directors) potentially run into the millions of dollars, one cannot conclude realistically
that Cook would be able to objectively and impartially consider a demand to bring litigation
against those to whom he is beholden for his current position and future position on eBay's
board.").
i io See In re Nat'l Auto Credit, Inc., S'holders Litig. 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 5, at *40 ("It
is not that the Directors' Fees are large amount paid on a regular basis; rather, the Directors'
Fees were the product of massive increases which reasonably can be inferred to have been
granted in return for the Defendant Directors' support .... ).
ii i Id. at *38; see also Grobow v. Perot, 526 A.2d 914, 923 n. 12 (Del. Ch. 1987), aff'd, 539
A.2d 18o (Del. 1988).
112 In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 359 (Del Ch. 1998)
("Furthermore, to do so would be to discourage the membership on corporate boards of peo-
ple of less-than extraordinary means. Such "regular folks" would face allegations of being
dominated by other board members, merely because of the relatively substantial compensa-
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supports this position. Both ignore the impact of the fees on the director's
decision-making process, the very purpose of the materiality test. More-
over, these explanations would not prohibit anyone from sitting on the
board, only from qualifying as independent. The approach essentially con-
cedes that the fees will sometimes be material and affect the decision-mak-
ing process, but should be ignored for questionable policy reasons.
2. Indirect Payments.-Indirect payments involve funds paid to another en-
tity, whether a corporation, partnership or limited liability company, where
the director has a position of control or otherwise benefits economically.
Independence will be impaired when the payments are material to the
supplier, vendor, customer, or director."3
Establishing materiality of the payments to the director is often dif-
ficult. Materiality may be inferred where the payments are large relative
to the size of the firm and the director is a principal or owner.'" 4 Otherwise,
plaintiffs must show a relationship between the payments and the direc-
tor's compensation." 5 Given the absence of public information on com-
pensation formulas, this can be difficult if not impossible."6 For example,
tion provided by the board membership compared to their outside salaries. I am especially
unwilling to facilitate such a result."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 746
A.2d z44 (Del. zooo).
113 See Khanna v. McMinn, No. 205 4 5-NC, 2oo6 Del. Ch. LEXIS 86, at *59 (Del. Ch.
May 9, 2oo6) (noting that the test is whether payments to vendor were material to the vendor
or material to the director).
114 See Zimmerman v. Braddock, No. 18473-NC, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 135, at *43 n.95
(Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2005) (noting that company was one of two largest clients, with five year
contract involving minimum payments of $5 million), rev'd, 9o6A.2d 776 (Del. 2006). Many of
these cases involve payments to law firms. SeeIn re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig.,
No. 16415,2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 7o, at *121 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004) (finding that company's
payments constituted most of law firm's revenues).
115 See In re Compucom Sys., Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 499-N, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS
145, at *37 (Del. Ch. Sept. 29, 2005) ("The plaintiff does not allege what compensation
Loewenberg and/or JDL Enterprises obtained for Loewenberg's advisory services, nor does
the complaint allege that such fees constituted such a large part of his or the firm's income
so as to be material to Loewenberg or JDL Enterprises."); Zimmerman, 2oo5 Del. Ch. LEXIS
135, at *42-43 (finding that director was not independent where company was the second
largest customer of business where he served as CEO); see also In re J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.
S'holder Litig., 906 A.zd 808,814-I6 (Del. Ch. 2oo5), aff'dsub nom. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.
S'holder Litig. v. Harrison, 906 A.2d 766 (Del. zoo6) (noting that directors were connected to
companies that used services of bank). Allegations of materiality are not enough. See Jacobs v.
Yang, No. 2o6-N, 2oo4 Del. Ch. LEXIS 117, at *24 (Del. Ch. Aug. 2, 2004) ("Merely stating
that the agreements between Yahoo! and AMG are 'crucial to AMG's continued viability' is
not enough.").
116 In Disney, Senator Mitchell was special counsel to a law firm used by the company.
The court noted the absence of facts showing how Mitchell benefited from the fees. In re
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Liig., 731 A.zd at 360. To provide the requisite information, the
plaintiff presumably would have needed to know the allocation formula within the law firm,
not something likely to be public.
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a director who was also a principal of a business receiving $400,000 a year
from the company did not lose his independence absent evidence of the
materiality of the payment.
11 7
The same is true in the case of interlocking directors.' 8 In Khanna v.
McMinn, 119 a director sat on the board of Covad Communication Group
and on the board of a vendor receiving $2.2 million in revenue from Co-
vad. The court dismissed the independence challenge, concluding that
the plaintiff had not produced facts sufficient to show the materiality of the
payment to the vendor or director.
The Court cannot discern whether the revenue ... is material to either [the
vendor] or to [the director] because of his relationship with [the vendor].
Neither the terms of [the vendor's] relationship with Covad (e.g., whether
the companies have entered into a long-term contract), nor particularized
facts supporting the Plaintiffs' conclusory statement in their brief that [the
vendor's] business ... could be "taken away"... are provided. Moreover, no
allegation has been made that [the director's] responsibilities to [the ven-
dor] include managing the firm's relationship with Covad; nor could the
Court conclude that [the director] has a financial interest in [the vendor],
other than possibly an unspecified director's salary, which might influence
his decisions.'
Having presented evidence of a disqualifying relationship, the court refused
to allow discovery to explore the facts surrounding the relationship."'
I 17 In reThe Ltd., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 17148-NC, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 28, at *19 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 27, zooz) ("The Complaint is devoid of any allegations asserting (or from which an
inference can reasonably be drawn, for that matter) that the $400,000 annual revenue that
Audio receives from its dealings with The Limited and its affiliates was material to Audio's
business. Moreover, the Complaint does not allege how Kollat, as "a principal," may have ben-
efited from any portion of those revenues. Accordingly, the plaintiffs have also failed to plead
particularized facts raising a reasonable doubt as to Kollat's independence.").
118 In reW. Nat'l Corp. S'holders Litig., No. 15927, 2ooo Del. Ch. LEXIS 8z, at *63 (Del.
Ch. May 22, 2000) ("Here, plaintiffs have not proffered any additional evidence that the bank-
ing relationship between Chase Texas and American General sterilized Buckwalter's discre-
tion or subverted his good faith evaluation of the merger's underlying corporate merits."); see
also Kaplan v. Wyatt, 499 A.zd 1184, 1189 (Del. 1985) (finding a director who was an affiliate
of a number of companies with which the nominal corporate defendant transacted sufficient
business to be independent). One court suggested that any traditional lending relationship
would not be enough. See In re J.P Mogan Chase & Co. S'holderLitig., 906 A.zd at 822 ("JPMC
is a national commercial and investment bank. That it provided financing to large American
companies should come as no shock to anyone. Yet this is all that the plaintiffs allege.").
i 19 Khanna v. McMinn, No. 20545-NC, 2oo6 Del. Ch. LEXIS 86, at *7 (Del. Ch. May
9, zoo6).
120 Id. at *65-66 (footnotes omitted).
121 While reiterating the strict pleading requirements, the court acknowledged but
ignored the Catch 22 that the required information was otherwise unavailable from public
sources, effectively making the pleading requirement impossible to meet. Id. at *89 n. 163
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Even where the payment is otherwise material, courts have some-
times required proof of actual influence. In Kaplan v. Wyatt, for example,
the plaintiff filed a derivative suit against, among others, Oscar Wyatt: the
CEO, Chairman, and founder of Coastal Corporation.' In response, the
board formed a special committee consisting of two directors. One of them,
J. Howard Marshall, owned interests in other companies doing business
with Coastal." 3 In dismissing the challenge to Marshall's independence,
the court ignored the multitude of business connections and instead re-
quired evidence that "Marshall's business affiliations influence[d] his deci-
sions relating to Coastal."'2 4
3. Indirect Payments and Non-Profits.-Directors frequently serve in posi-
tions of authority with non-profit organizations.' As a general matter, they
do not lose their independence even where the company or its employees
make significant contributions to the charity, despite the obvious potential
for influence. Courts use a variety of mechanisms to achieve this result.
They typically require that the director receive a direct benefit from the
contributions, or that the director has actually been influenced by the pay-
ments. 
26
("The Court notes that the factual paucity described above may have resulted from difficul-
ties in accessing certain information. Indeed, even after using the "tools at hand" to develop
particularized facts (e.g., public filings and § 2zo), certain information may be restricted due to
the fact that it is held by entities with no public disclosure obligations. Although the burdens
presented by such obstacles have been recognized, the pleading standard under which the
Court examines allegations for requisite particularity remains unaltered, even for plaintiffs
who employed the 'tools at hand."' (citation omitted)); see also Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244,
268 (Del. 2000) (Hartnett, J., concurring) ("Plaintiffs must not be held to a too-high standard
of pleading because they face an almost impossible burden when they must plead facts with
particularity and the facts are not public knowledge.").
122 Kaplan, 499 A.Zd at 1186.
123 He and members of his family owned two percent of Koch Industries (Koch), a com-
pany that did business with Coastal. One year, the business between the two companies
was $266 million. The court noted that this was less than two percent of Koch's sales. In ad-
dition to the oil sales, Koch sold Coastal an oil tanker. Id. at 1 187. He owned fifty percent of
the shares of Petroleum Corporation (Petco), which engaged in ventures with subsidiaries of
Coastal. The ventures "contributed large amounts of money to Petco's programs." Id.
124 Id. at 1 189; see also In re J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. S'holder Litig., 906 A.2d 8o8, 822
(Del. Ch. 2005) ("JPMC is a national commercial and investment bank. That it provided
financing to large American companies should come as no shock to anyone. Yet this is all that
the plaintiffs allege.").
125 One study of the top too largest companies indicated that a majority of the compa-
nies have directors who are officers of non-profit organizations. See SHEARMAN & STERLING,
LLP, supra note io6, at io (fifty-six percent with directors who also serve as officers; thirty
percent who serve as directors of a non-profit; twenty-seven percent who serve as a trustee of
a nonprofit; eleven percent who serve as employees of a non-profit; and two percent who are
"affiliated" with a non-profit).
126 See In reThe Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 359 (Del. Ch. 1998)
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In J.P Morgan,27 for example, a director also served as the president and
a trustee for the American Museum of Natural History."8 The plaintiffs
challenged the director's independence by asserting that J.P. Morgan Chase
(JPMC) was a significant benefactor of the Museum.29 The two institu-
tions also had a long history, with J. Pierpont Morgan having been one of
the Museum's earliest supporters. 3 ' The court discounted the relationship,
faulting the complaint for failing to show "any potential influence" result-
ing from the contributions. "The plaintiffs state that JPMC is a significant
benefactor, but they never state how JPMC's contributions could, or did,
affect the decision-making process of the president of one of the largest
museums in the nation."'
31
The case essentially ignored the influence inherent in large contribu-
tions. Even if not quantitatively material, non-profits have an incentive to
maintain funding sources. 32 Contributions on the margin may make the
difference in the success of a non-profit's mission or the ability to continue
a particularly important program. Executive directors may receive psychic
benefits by ensuring the success of a cause they believe in; their pay, to the
extent that it is performance-based, may be affected by continued success
in fund raising.
Imposing an obligation to show actual influence as a result of the gift
ignores these effects. The court also failed to explain how such an "effect"
could be demonstrated, particularly given that evidence of director vot-
ing patterns typically receives little probative weight in the independence
(Eisner made $i million contribution to university run by director; director independent be-
cause he did not benefit directly from contribution), aff'd in part, rev'din partsub nom. Brehm
v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2ooo); see also In re Gen. Motors (Hughes) S'holder Litig., No.
20269, 2oo5 Del. Ch. LEXIS 65, at *34 (Del. Ch. May 4, 2005) ("Missing, however, is any
allegation that this contribution conferred a material benefit on Ward at the expense of the
Corporation or its Shareholders."), aff'd, 897 A.zd 162 (Del. 2oo6).
127 See In re J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. S'holder Litig., 906 A.zd at 822 ("The plaintiffs
state that JPMC is a significant benefactor, but they never state how JPMC's contributions
could, or did, affect the decision-making process of the president of one of the largest muse-
ums in the nation.").
128 Id. at 814.
129 Id. at 822.
13o American Museum of Natural History, Timeline, available at http://www.amnh.org/
museum/history/?src=pvh.
131 In reJ.P. Morgan Chase & Co. S'holder Litig., 9o6A.zd at 822.
132 See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Corporate Conduct that Does not Maximize
Shareholder Gain: Legal Conduct, Ethical Conduct, the Penumbra Effect, Reciprocity, the Prisoner's
Dilemma, Sheep's Clothing, Social Conduct, and Disclosure, 28 STETSON L. REV. 1 (1998); Faith
Stevelman Kahn, Foreword: Law, Culture, Education, and Politics, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 753
(1997); Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora ' Box: Managerial Discretion andthe Problem of Corporate
Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REv. 579 (1997).
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analysis.133 The standard, therefore, is an extraordinarily difficult one to
meet, particularly absent any right to discovery.
C. Non-Pecuniary Relationships
1. Non-Development.-Aronson broadly defined "independent" as a decision
on the merits, unaffected by "extraneous considerations or influences."' '
Nothing in Aronson limited the notion of "extraneous considerations" to
pecuniary benefits. Nonetheless, for the two decades following the deci-
sion, courts did exactly that. Other than some family relationships,13 s courts
treated personal and outside business relationships as irrelevant to the
analysis of independence.'36 The same was true of other potentially bias-
133 See Khanna v. McMinn, No. 20545-NC, 2oo6 Del. Ch. LEXIS 86, at *58 n.92 (Del.
Ch. May 9, 2oo6) ("Although there may be instances in which a director's voting history would
be sufficient to negate a director's presumed independence, routine consensus cannot suf-
fice to demonstrate disloyalty on the part of a director. To conclude otherwise would simply
encourage staged disagreements and nonunanimous decisions for the sake of nonunanimous
decisions in the boardroom."); see also Kohls v. Duthie, 791 A.zd 772, 781 (Del. Ch. 2000)
(discounting allegations that "dominated" director voted on transaction beneficial to CEO;
"More importantly, Christenson, an outside director, was simply one of a unanimous board
(other than Lerdal) to approve the transaction.").
134 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984), overruled in part by Brehm v. Eisner,
746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
135 See In re The Ltd., Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 17148-NC, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 28,
at *13 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2002) (noting that wife stood to benefit from transaction that aided
spouse). Even on this point, however, the courts have been inconsistent. See In re Oracle Corp.
Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 939 (Del. Ch. 2003) ("Without backtracking from these gen-
eral propositions, it would be less than candid if I did not admit that Delaware courts have ap-
plied these general standards in a manner that has been less than wholly consistent. Different
decisions take a different view about the bias-producing potential of family relationships, not
all of which can be explained by mere degrees of consanguinity."). For the differing results
on this point, compare, for example, Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.zd 1207, 1216 (Del. 1996) (find-
ing that familial interest is a basis for demand excusal), overruled in part by Brehm v. Eisner,
746 A.2d 244 (Del. zooo), Harbor Financial Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 889 (Del. Ch.
1999) (CEO's brother-in-law could not be impartial), and Mizel v. Connelly, 1999 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 157, at *8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 2, 1999) (grandson could not be impartial), with Abrams v.
Koether, 766 E Supp. 237, 256 (D.N.J. 1991) (noting that "allegations that making demand
would call on the Defendants to sue their friends, family and business associates are insuf-
ficient" to demonstrate demand futility), Grace Bros. v. UniHolding Corp., No. 17612, 2000
Del. Ch. LEXIS io, at *32 (Del. Ch. July 12, 2000) (finding reasonable doubt whether a
director impartially could consider demand adverse to the interests of his brother-in-law) and
Seibert v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., No.'6639, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 523, at *9 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 5, 1984) (cousin could be impartial).
136 See Cal. Pub. Employee's Ret. Sys. v. Coulter, No. 19191, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 144,
at *29 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2002) ("Our cases have determined that personal friendships, with-
out more; outside business relationships, without more.., are each insufficient to raise a reason-
able doubt of a director's ability to exercise independent business judgment."); In re The
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.zd 342, 355 (Del. Ch. 1998) ("The fact that the
[CEO] has ... long standing personal and business ties to [the employee] cannot overcome
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producing motivations such as prestige or embarrassment. 13 7 Thus, a board
could be packed with friends and business partners of the CEO without
losing its status as independent.
This counterintuitive view ultimately became too much for the courts,
and tentative efforts gradually emerged which recognized that non-pecu-
niary relationships could sometimes impair independence. 3 As one chan-
cery court acknowledged:
Delaware law should not be based on a reductionist view of human nature
that simplifies human motivations on the lines of the least sophisticated no-
tions of the law and economics movement. Homo sapiens is not merely homo
economicus. We may be thankful that an array of other motivations exist that
influence human behavior; not all are any better than greed or avarice, think
of envy, to name just one. But also think of motives like love, friendship,
and collegiality, think of those among us who direct their behavior as best
they can on a guiding creed or set of moral values. 3 9
Acknowledgement, however, did not translate into practical acceptance.
Subsequent decisions remained decidedly unsympathetic to allegations of
bias arising out of friendship and outside business activities.14° With one
the presumption of independence that all directors ... are afforded."), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part sub nor. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.zd 244 (Del. zooo); see also Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d
5, 28 (Del. Ch. 2002).
137 See Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d i8o, 188 (Del. 1988) ("Plaintiffs merely argue that
Perot's public criticism of GM management could cause the directors embarrassment suf-
ficient to lead to their removal from office. Such allegations are tenuous at best and are too
speculative to raise a reasonable doubt of director disinterest.").
138 See Orman, 794 A.2d at 27 ("Although mere recitation of the fact of past business or
personal relationships will not make the Court automatically question the independence of
a challenged director, it may be possible to plead additional facts concerning the length, na-
ture or extent of those previous relationships that would put in issue that director's ability to
objectively consider the challenged transaction." (citing In re Ply Gem Indus., Inc. S'holders
Litig., 15779-NC, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 123 (Del. Ch. Sept. 28, 2001)); In rNew Valley Corp.
Derivative Litig., No. 17649, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 13, at *25 (Del. Ch. Jan. ii, zooi) (noting
in connection with the Court's consideration of allegations of interest and lack of indepen-
dence that, "the facts alleged in the complaint show that all the members of the current Board
have current or past business, personal, and employment relationships with each other and
the entities involved"); Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.zd 293, 299 n.4 (Del. Ch. 2000)
("Unitrin defines an independent director as one who can base her judgments on the corpo-
rate merits without being influenced by extraneous influences, such as personal relationships
the director has with management or a controlling stockholder, or other material financial
relationships the director has with the corporation.").
139 In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d at 938; see also Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret.
Sys., 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 144, at *29 (noting that together, allegations of a personal relation-
ship, outside business relationships and acquiescence in the challenged transactions provided
reason to doubt director's disinterest or independence).
140 See Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P v. Turner, 846 A.ad 963, 98o-981 (Del. Ch. 2003)
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unusual exception, no case found this type of relationship to be disqualify-
ing.
141
2. The Non-DevelopmentDevelopment.-The Delaware Supreme Court ulti-
mately intervened in a case involving Martha Stewart, holding for the first
time that non-family personal relationships could result in loss of indepen-
dence. Stewart served as the CEO and chairman of Omnimedia and owned
94% of the stock. The plaintiffs challenged the independence of several
directors who served on the board, focusing primarily on Stewart's personal
relationships with directors Martinez' 4 and Moore. 43 Despite the fact that
Stewart had longstanding friendships with both, the chancery court grant-
ed a motion to dismiss, concluding that the allegations in the complaint did
not raise reasonable doubt about their independence."*
("In support, they allege that Turner controls Hunt because of their long-standing 15-year
professional and personal relationship. This allegation alone fails to raise a reasonable doubt
that Hunt could not exercise his independent business judgment in approving the transac-
tion."). More recent cases have suggested a greater degree of openness to the argument.
See Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.zd 43, 49 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2000) ("[A] fiduciary may act disloyally
for a variety of reasons other than personal pecuniary interest; and ... regardless of his mo-
tive, a director who consciously disregards his duties to the corporation and its stockholders
may suffer a personal judgment for monetary damages for any harm he causes."); In re RJR
Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., No. 10389, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9, at *46 (Del. Ch. Feb.
14, 1989) ("Greed is not the only human emotion that can pull one from the path of propriety;
so might hatred, lust, envy, revenge, or, as is here alleged, shame or pride. Indeed any human
emotion may cause a director to place his own interests, preferences or appetites before the
welfare of the corporation."); see also Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.zd 257, 264 (Del. 2002)
("A controlled director is one who is dominated by another party, whether through close per-
sonal or familial relationship or through force of will." (citation omitted)).
14I See In ir Oracle Corp. Derivative Liftig., 824 A.2d 917. The court only did so in a case
involving a special committee where the company had the burden of establishing indepen-
dence. Interestingly, the Delaware Supreme Court took it upon itself to raise doubts about
the validity of the decision. See Beam ex ref. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart,
845 A.2d 1040, 1o54-55 (Del. 2004). In California Public Employees' Retirement System, 2002
Del. Ch. LEXIS 144, friendship was one factor among many that caused the court to agree
that the plaintiff had sufficiently pled that a director was not independent.
142 See Beam, 845 A.zd at 1o44. Martinez was recruited for the board by Stewart's long-
time personal friend, Charlotte Beers. According to a published article, Patrick stated that
Martinez "is an old friend to both me and Martha." Id.
143 The friendship between Moore and Stewart was noted in an article in Fortune maga-
zine. See Charlotte Beers, Martha Stewart, & Darla Moore, Cocktails at Charlotte's with Martha
and Darla, FORTUNE, Aug. 5, 1996, at 56.
144 As the Chancery Court noted: "The amended complaint does specify the various
retainers, meeting fees, and other perquisites afforded the directors, but it is not obvious from
the allegations that such compensation would be sufficient to entice any of the outside direc-
tors to ignore fiduciary duties to MSO and its shareholders. Nor does plaintiff suggest that
the outside directors have a history of blindly following Stewart's will or even accepting her
recommendations without adequate independent study and investigation." Beam v. Stewart,
833 A.2d 961,978-79 (Del. Ch. zoo3).
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On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court took the opportunity to dis-
cuss the effect of outside personal relationships on director independence.
The court acknowledged that "a variety of motivations" could impair inde-
pendence, "including friendship." 45 Nonetheless, friendship alone was not
enough."4 Instead, plaintiffs had to show that "the non-interested director
would be more willing to risk his or her reputation than risk the relationship
with the interested director."' 47 The opinion discounted relationships that
arose from a "structural bias," whether before or after joining the board.
This test appears to require something akin to a balancing test, weigh-
ing friendship against professional reputation. Aside from the absence of
guidance on how to do this, the approach suffers from a faulty premise. It
presupposes that only friendships strong enough to risk professional repu-
tation can create the possibility of biased decision-making. In fact, friend-
ships of lesser intensity can easily influence directors' decisions.'
41
The test also assumes that decisions to support the CEO over the best
interests of shareholders will be harmful to reputation, a zero-sum game
of sorts. It is not even entirely clear that every director has a professional
reputation that can suffer much harm. Indeed, resolute support for a CEO
may actually be seen as an asset. 149 More importantly, not every board deci-
145 Beam, 845 A.2d at Io5o; see also In re Compucom Sys., Inc. Stockholders Litig., No.
4 9 9 -N, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 145, at *34 (Del. Ch. Sept. z9, 2oo5) ("The court recognizes that
under certain circumstances, professional, financial, and personal relationships of directors
may preclude a finding of independence." (citing Krasner v. Moffett, 8z6 A.zd 277, 283 (Del.
2003)).
146 The Court adopted the reasoning of the Chancery Court: "Some professional or per-
sonal friendships, which may border on or even exceed familial loyalty and closeness, may
raise a reasonable doubt whether a director can appropriately consider demand. This is par-
ticularly true when the allegations raise serious questions of either civil or criminal liability of
such a close friend. Not all friendships, or even most of them, rise to this level and the Court
cannot make a reasonable inference that a particular friendship does so without specific factual
allegations to support such a conclusion." Beam, 845 A.zd at o5o (citing Beam, 833 A.2d at
979).
147 Id. at 1052. Although focusing on friendship, subsequent courts have held that the
analysis also applied to outside business relationships. See Khanna v. McMinn, No. 20545-NC,
2oo6 Del. Ch. LEXIS 86, at *60 (Del. Ch. May 9, zoo6) (noting that while Beam primarily ap-
plied to social relationships, the analysis also applied to business relationships).
148 This approach seems to presume that the director must either support the CEO or
shareholders. Most decisions are, however, more complicated than that. Friendship may sim-
ply tip the balance at the margin.
149 Directors who have a reputation for objecting to actions by the CEO may find it dif-
ficult to find a board that will accept them. See Troy A. Paredes, Corporate Decisionmaking: Too
Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 673, 730 (zoo5) ("[O]utside directors face only a slight risk of legal liability
under state corporate law for failing to satisfy their responsibility to act with due care, even
when they are relatively passive and essentially go along with management's recommenda-
tions for the business. Accordingly, there is little upside if directors oppose or even seriously
challenge the CEO, and yet there are downside risks for doing so." (footnote omitted)).
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sion involves a stark Hobson's choice between shareholders and interested
directors. Given the broad and malleable nature of fiduciary duties, it will
rarely be clear that a decision was designed to favor the interested director
at the expense of shareholders.
Subsequent decisions have provided little clarity but have continued
the pre-Beam tradition of refusing to find any personal relationship suffi-
cient to impair independence. Thus, in Khanna v. McMinn, the plaintiff al-
leged that two directors had a close personal relationship that included the
ownership of homes in the same neighborhood and in "neighboring winer-
ies." "o50 The court conceded that the directors were "not strangers-indeed,
they may be fairly close."' 51 Nonetheless, the facts were considered little
more than a "characterization that they are close friends," resulting in dis-
missal without discovery.' s
Beam corrected an obvious and embarrassing analytical weakness in
Delaware's approach to independence.5 3 The strong suggestion that non-
familial, non-pecuniary relationships could not impair independence was
inconsistent with common sense and provided the appearance of an out-
come-determinative test. At the same time, however, Beam and its prog-
eny have continued to impose an essentially insurmountable barrier in the
analysis of these relationships,'-' with such cases routinely dismissed. 5
Indeed, the court in Beam went out of its way to emphasize that friendships
arising as a result of board membership would not be subject to challenge.
The court did so even though the issue was irrelevant to the case and even
though independence focuses on the nature of the relationship rather than
the method of formation.5 6 Thus, notwithstanding the ostensible ground-
15o Khanna, 2oo6 Del. Ch. LEXIS 86 at *io.
151 Id. at *19.
152 Id. at *77.
153 The motivation may have been to fend off federal intervention. See infra note 235.
154 See Benihana, Inc. of Tokyo v. Benihana, Inc., 891 A.zd 150, 179 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(finding that director did not lose independence despite forty to forty-five year friendship
and meeting with interested director every ten to fourteen days; evidence of a "longstanding
friendship" not enough to show loss of independence), aff'd, 9o6 A.zd 114 (Del. 2oo6); see
also Velasco, supra note 14, at 844 (describing burden on plaintiffs of proving a disqualifying
friendship as "especially onerous given that the plaintiff is required to make its case on the
pleadings, with particularized allegations, and without the benefit of discovery.").
155 See Gatz v. Ponsoldt, No. 17 4-N, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 203, at *21 (Del. Ch. Nov. 8,
2004) ("Although the complaint alleges that one of the members of the independent commit-
tee, Glasser, has had 'significant prior business dealings with Levy,' such a conclusory allega-
tion does not demonstrate that Glasser has an inability to consider impartially issues related to
potential transgressions involving Levy, let alone Ponsoldt." (footnote omitted)).
156 The entire analysis was dicta given that the relationships with Stewart preceded
their time together on the board. See Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc.
v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1051 (Del. 2004) ("Even if the alleged friendships may have pre-
ceded the directors' membership on MSO's board and did not necessarily arise out of that
membership, these relationships are of the same nature as those giving rise to the structural
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breaking nature of the analysis in Beam,157 little has changed in practice.5 8
Personal relationships are not a meaningful basis for challenging board in-
dependence. 59
IV. T E PRESUMPTION OF INDEPENDENCE AND
UNREASONABLE PLEADING STANDARDS
The courts use a variety of analytically inconsistent mechanisms to dismiss
challenges to a director's independence. They purport to rely on a material-
ity threshold but ignore it when convenient, as in the application (or non-
application) to directors' fees. The courts acknowledge that personal and
outside business relationships can impair independence, but apply a test
that all but guarantees that these relationships never do. Mostly, though,
the courts use unreasonable pleading standards to dismiss challenges be-
fore discovery has occurred."6
bias argument.").
157 Some commentators saw a hopeful shift in the law when the Chancery Court held
in Oracle that personal relationships could result in a loss of independence. See Paredes, supra
note 149, at 731 (describing the case as a noteworthy trend). The opinion in Beam, particularly
its unusual decision to discuss and criticize Oracle, has made the trend a short one. See Beam,
845 A.2d at 1054-55 (criticizing the Oracle decision).
158 See Lisa M. Fairfax, Sarbanes-Oxley, Corporate Federalism, and the Declining Significance
of Federal Reforms on State Director Independence Standards, 31 OHio N.U. L. REv. 381, 402
(2005) ("As a practical matter, the approach demonstrates a judicial desire to impede these
types of challenges. The basis, however, has little to do with a desire to determine indepen-
dence. Instead, courts seem more concerned with the widespread nature of board friendships
and the possibility of constant challenges. To the extent these relationships can be a basis for
challenging a director's independence, the status of all independent directors will arguably be
open to challenge,").
159 For a discussion of relationships that can arise through interaction on the board and
their impact on decision making, see Marleen A. O'Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of
Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1246 (2003) ("On the upside, long terms for directors
foster collegiality that promotes the notion of'fictive friendship' among directors. To a certain
degree, cohesiveness is essential to promote good working relationships among board mem-
bers. On the downside, the presence of such 'fictive friendships' on the board creates social
norms that make it inappropriate for the independent directors to challenge their 'friends."').
16o See Beam, 845 A.2d at io56 ("In general, derivative plaintiffs are not entitled to dis-
covery in order to demonstrate demand futility." (footnote omitted)); Rales v. Blasband, 634
A.2d 927, 934 n.io (Del. 1993) ("[Derivative plaintiffs] are not entitled to discovery to assist
their compliance with Rule 23. 1 .... " (citation omitted)); Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194,
zo8-21o (Del. 1991) (refusing to extend the availability of limited discovery to either demand
refused cases or demand excused cases, absent the Zapata context relating to an SLC), over-
ruled in part by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); see also Scattered Corp. v. Chi.
Stock Exch., 701 A.2d 70, 77 (Del. 1997) ("The law in Delaware is settled that plaintiffs in a
derivative suit are not entitled to discovery to assist their compliance with the particularized
pleading requirement of Rule 23.1 in a case of demand refusal. A plaintiff's standing to sue in
a derivative suit, whether based on demand-refused or demand-excused, must be determined
on the basis of the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint." (footnotes omitted)), overruled
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The courts routinely require as part of the particularity standard facts
that are not readily available.1 6' They often blame shareholders for the ab-
sence of the required information, insisting that it resulted from a failure
to invoke inspection rights. 6 In fact, the necessary information is rarely, if
ever, available this way, something clear at least to some Delaware courts.
The required use of inspection rights, therefore, does little more than delay
and increase costs with little resulting advantage.' 63
The courts also apply the higher pleading standards in an inconsistent
fashion. Sometimes plaintiffs are allowed a reasonable inference from the
alleged facts, 6 but more often they are not. Other times the courts seem
to change the rules mid-stream, finding that plaintiffs alleged the wrong
facts.' 65 After making their own factual findings, courts sometimes dispose
of the cases on a motion to dismiss.166
inpartby Brehm, 746 A.zd 244; Kaufman v. Belmont, 479 A.2d z8z, 289 (Del. Ch. 1984) ("In
the Rule 23.1 context only the pleadings are considered and the plaintiff is not entitled to take
discovery to supplement his allegations of demand futility." (citations omitted)).
161 See supra note 121.
162 See infra note 187.
163 Shareholders may only recover attorney fees associated with an action under section
220 if they can establish bad faith, a difficult standard. See Haywood v. AmBase Corp., 2005
Del. Ch. LEXIS 131 (Del. Ch. Aug. 22, 2005).
164 See Zimmerman v. Braddock, No. 18473-NC, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 135, at *43 n.95
(Del. Ch. Sept. 8, zoo5) (deeming allegations that company was one of two largest clients
sufficient despite absence of any facts concerning the amount of business or its importance;
"given that the Plaintiff is entitled to all fair and reasonable inferences from the well-pled
facts alleged in its Second Amended Complaint, at this stage of the proceedings it would be
unreasonable not to infer the materiality of Priceline's business to Worldspan"), r'd, 906
A.2d 776 (Del. 2oo6).
165 Thus, in In reJ.P Morgan Chase &Co. S'holderLiig., 906 A.zd 8o8 (Del. Ch. 2005), one
of the directors served as the president and CEO of a non-profit. Plaintiff alleged that the or-
ganization received $i million in matching donations from JPMC in 2003 and that JPMC and
its employees contributed over $18 million since 199o. Finally, the CEO of JPMC served as
treasurer. Id. at 815. Despite the considerable amount of information about the relationship,
the court concluded that the facts did not meet the "particularity" requirement. Essentially,
shareholders relied on the wrong facts; it was not the dollar amount of the relationship that
was important. "[T]he plaintiffs fail to indicate how JPMC's contributions would affect UNCF
and therefore influence Gray. The plaintiffs provide only the dollar value, not the representa-
tive percentage, of JPMC's contributions to UNCE" Id. at 824.
166 In Khanna v. McMinn, No. 20545-NC, 2oo6 Del. Ch. LEXIS 86 (Del. Ch. May 9,
2oo6), the plaintiffs argued that a director who was president and CEO of one of the defen-
dant company's customers was not independent because he "would not want to jeopardize
the current pricing structure offered [to his company.]" Id. at *87. The court concluded, at
the pleading stage, that a customer would not fear a price increase from the company because
the services could be purchased elsewhere. The court ruled that "the Plaintiffs' allegations are
insufficiently particularized to displace the notion that, in this context, if Covad unilaterally
raised its prices relative to the market, TelePacific would purchase from another, lower-priced
seller." Id. at *88. Given that the case was at the pleading stage and the court had no informa-
tion about the elasticity of the particular market, the conclusion was a factual determination
made without the benefit of facts.
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Finally, courts simply ignore facts that indicate a disqualifying relation-
ship. ' 67 They commonly decide the issue of independence as if plaintiffs
had to meet their substantive burden in the complaint, rather than merely
providing a "reasonable basis." As a result, they dismiss the claims without
allowing further exploration into the nature of the relationship.
A. Heightened Standards
Delaware courts presume independence. 16' To overcome the presumption,
plaintiffs must allege facts that demonstrate "reasonable doubt" about a
director's independence.' 69 Furthermore, the facts must be pled with par-
ticularity,70 a standard substantially greater than the one applied to notice
pleading.171
This heightened pleading requirement emanates from rule 23.1, the
provision addressing derivative suits. 7 ' The rule requires that demand
167 Here the cases are too numerous to list. Disney is a good example. Seeinfra notes 199-
249 and accompanying text. So is Beam. See infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
168 Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1049
(Del. 2004).
169 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.zd 805,815 (Del. 1984), overruled in part by Brehm v. Eisner,
746 A.2d 244 (Del. zooo).
170 The burden rests with the plaintiff, subject to two exceptions. The first is where a
board, in a demand futility case, seeks to form a special committee to consider whether to
maintain the action. In those circumstances, the board bears the burden of establishing the in-
dependence of the members. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.zd 917, 937 (Del. Ch.
2003) ("I begin with an important reminder: the SLC [special litigation committee] bears the
burden of proving its independence."); see also Beam, 845 A.2d at io55 ("Unlike the demand-
excusal context, where the board is presumed to be independent, the SLC has the burden of
establishing its own independence by a yardstick that must be 'like Caesar's wife'-'above
reproach."' (footnote omitted)). The other involves transactions between the company and
controlling shareholders. In those circumstances, the board may form a special committee, but
it has the burden of establishing that the directors are independent. Kahn v. Tremont Corp.,
694 A.2d 422,429 (Del. 1997); see also Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1222-23 (Del.
1999) ("This Court has identified two scenarios that can provide the basis for shifting the
burden to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the transaction complained of was not entirely fair.
First, an approval of the transaction by an independent committee of directors who have real
bargaining power that can be exerted in dealings with a majority shareholder who does not
dictate the terms of the merger may supply the necessary basis for shifting the burden." (cita-
tions omitted)); In reTele-Commn'cs, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 16470, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS
2o6, at *33 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 200S) ("In order to shift the burden, defendants must establish
that the special committee was truly independent, fully informed, and had the freedom to
negotiate at arm's length." (footnote omitted)).
171 See White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 553 n.34 (Del. zoo) (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746
A.zd 244, 553 n.34 (Del. 2ooo)); see also Brehm, 746 A.zd at 254 ("[Rule 23. 1] pleadings must
comply with stringent requirements of factual particularity that differ substantially from the
permissive notice pleadings.").
172 See Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 891 A.2d 150, 176 n. 154 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(noting that cases dealing with director independence under section i44 and rule 23.1 applied
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futility be pled "with particularity." '173 The higher standard prevents the
shareholder from causing "the corporation to expend money and resources
in discovery and trial in the stockholder's quixotic pursuit of a purported
corporate claim based solely on conclusions, opinions or speculation."
' 17 4
The heightened standard also applies regardless of whether the issue arises
in the context of demand excuse or the duty of loyalty. 75
B. Impact of the Heightened Standards
The problem is not simply that the courts impose higher standards. The
standards are applied in a manner that is essentially impossible to meet,
something courts have occasionally acknowledged. 7 6 In the absence of
discovery, plaintiffs are left with whatever information can be gleaned from
public sources.7 While some information bearing on independence must
appear in the periodic reports and proxy statements of public companies, 78
the sources rarely provide information adequate to meet the specificity re-
quirements. Moreover, such reports do not always disclose information
about these relationships, even when legally required to do so. 17 9
same standard), aff'd, 906 A.2d I L4 (Del. zoo6)..
173 Plaintiffs must allege in the complaint "with particularity the efforts, if any,... made
by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable
authority and the reasons for the plaintiff's failure to obtain the action or for not making the
effort." White, 783 A.zd at 551 n.20 (quoting DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1).
174 Brehm, 746 A.2d at 254-55.
175 See Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.zd 5, 25 (Del. Ch. 2002).
176 See supra note 12 .
177 See Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 n.io (Del. 1993) ("[Dlerivative plaintiffs..
are not entitled to discovery to assist their compliance with Rule 23. 1 . (citation omit-
ted)).
178 See Item 401 of Regulation S-K, 17 C.ER. § 229.401 (g)(2)(z)(h)( )(B) (2006) (specify-
ing information that must be disclosed about directors, including business experience, other
directorships, family relationships, and involvement in certain legal proceedings); Item 404 of
Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.404 (zoo6) (addressing disclosure of certain relationships and
related-party transactions by directors).
179 Disney, for example, failed to disclose that three directors-Reveta Bowers, Stanley
Gold, and Ray Watson-had children working for the company, receiving salaries from $60,000
to more than $i5o,ooo. See In re Disney, Exchange Act Release No. 5o882 2004 SEC LEXIS
3000, at 3-4 (Dec. 20, 2004). In addition, Disney paid a company owned by Roy Disney for
services, with the payments amounting to more than five percent of the company's gross rev-
enues, and those were not the only omissions. Id. at *5 (noting that the wife of one director
was employed by company where Disney held a fifty percent interest and received a salary of
more than $i million; another director received undisclosed compensation of secretarial ser-
vices and a leased car with a driver). The case did not reveal whether the relatinship existed
at the time of the decision assessing the independence of the Disney directors. See In re The
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.zd 342 (Del. Ch. 1998), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub
nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). For a similar situation involving a different
company, see Millenco LP v. meVC Draper Fisher Jurvetson Fund I, Inc., 824 A.2d I1, 15-17
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The difficulty is particularly acute given the use of a subjective ma-
teriality standard. At the pleading stage, plaintiffs may need to produce
facts concerning the amount of an income stream and its importance,8 0 the
specific financial condition of each individual director,' the compensation
formula used by the firm receiving the funds,' and the CEO's specific
authority concerning the renewal of a lease. 83 None of this information is
typically available from public sources.
The same is true of disqualifying personal relationships. Courts have
imposed a test that requires, at the pleading stage, a considerable amount
of evidence about the strength of the friendship. This type of information
is ordinarily difficult to discern from public sources given its personal and
private nature. Yet where plaintiffs have managed to uncover public infor-
mation about these relationships, the courts have nonetheless dismissed
the plaintiffs' complaints for lack of specificity.
Take Beam. The plaintiffs found an interview in Fortune magazine of
three people: Martha Stewart; Darla Moore, the allegedly non-independent
director; and Charlotte Beers, another longstanding friend, who Moore re-
placed on the board. The three women described themselves as "best bud-
dies" and the interview unquestionably had a relaxed and friendly tone."8
In addition, plaintiffs produced evidence that Moore and Stewart attended
(Del. Ch. 2002) (finding that proxy statement failed to disclose business relationships be-
tween inside and two "independent" directors in violation of state fiduciary obligations of dis-
closure). In other cases, disclosure of information suggesting a disqualifying relationship may
not always be required. See Alan Murray, How UnitedHealth Spotlights Gap in Reform, WALL
ST. J., Oct. i8, zoo6, at A2 (noting that company did not disclose that director who chaired
compensation committee "served as trustee for two trusts benefiting the CEO's children and
managed between $15 million and $55 million of the [CEO's] family fortune" and that CEO
invested $500,000 in director's business).
i8o SeIn reCompucom Sys., Inc., No. 499-N, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 145, at *2 1 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 29, zoo5) (finding consulting relationship insufficient where plaintiff did not allege facts
establishing materiality of relationship); see also Khanna v. McMinn, No. 205 45-NC, zoo6 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 86, at *64-65 (Del. Ch. May 9, 2oo6) (noting that plaintiff alleged that customer
bought $2.2 million from company, but holding that the court could not discern materiality of
amount from facts in complaint).
I81 See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.zd at 360.
18z See id. for a discussion of Mitchell's employment by a law firm used by Disney. The
court notes that the plaintiffs "have not indicated that Mitchell, as 'special counsel' (and not
'partner') shared in the legal fees paid to his firm." Id.
183 See Litt v. Wycoff, No. i 9o83 -NC, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 23, at * 19 n.34 (Del. Ch. Mar.
28, 2003) ("The Complaint does not support any contention that Wycoff, as Chief Executive
Officer, is vested with unilateral non-reviewable authority to breach contracts on behalf of
Progress, was the unilateral decision-maker for leasing the property in question, or could be
expected to be the unilateral decision-maker with respect to renewal of the fifteen-year lease
upon its expiration.").
184 See Charlotte Beers, Martha Stewart & Darla Moore, Cocktails at Charlotte's with
Martha and Darla, FORTUNE, Aug. 5, 1996, at 56.
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a social function that almost certainly had a restricted invitation list. 8 ' Fi-
nally, Stewart owned ninety-four percent of the voting stock, giving her
final say on any possible board candidate.
Plaintiffs only needed to present a "reasonable doubt" about indepen-
dence. Without anything that would pass for analysis, the court concluded
that "these bare social relationships clearly do not create a reasonable doubt
of independence."'86 This was a mischaracterization. Plaintiffs did more
than allege "bare social relationships." The complaint specifically asserted
that Stewart and Moore had a longstanding friendship and provided sup-
port for this contention. The court also failed to indicate information that
would suffice and did not recognize the practical difficulties in obtaining
public information about friendships.
C. The Search for Particularized Facts
In what has to be an odd twist, the Delaware courts ultimately recognized
the difficulties imposed on plaintiffs in pleading "with specificity" facts that
are not publicly available. Rather than do the obvious and either loosen the
pleading requirements or permit limited discovery, they forced sharehold-
ers to invoke their inspections rights and examine the books and records of
the company. Shareholders were chastised for failing to use these "tools at
hand" before bringing an action to challenge director independence.
8 7
The notion that inspection rights might substitute for discovery is, in
most cases, far-fetched. The likelihood that this avenue would uncover in-
formation useful in determining subjective materiality or the strength of a
185 It was a wedding reception held by Stewart's lawyer for his daughter. See Beam ex el.
Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d IO4O, 1046 (Del. 2004); see also
David Marcus, Norms Swan Song, DAILY DEAL, Apr. 12, 2004, 2004 WLNR 17772320.
186 SeeBeam, 845 A.zd at 1054.
187 See id. at 1056 ("Beam's failure to plead sufficient facts to support her claim of de-
mand futility may be due in part to her failure to exhaust all reasonably available means of
gathering facts. As the Chancellor noted, had Beam first brought a Section 220 action seeking
inspection of MSO's books and records, she might have uncovered facts that would have cre-
ated a reasonable doubt." (footnotes omitted)); Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.zd 927,935 n. io (Del.
1993) ("[Tihey have many avenues available to obtain information bearing on the subject
of their claims. For example, there is a variety of public sources from which the details of
a corporate act may be discovered, including the media and governmental agencies such as
the Securities and Exchange Commission. In addition, a stockholder who has met the proce-
dural requirements and has shown a specific proper purpose may use the summary procedure
embodied in 8 Del. C. § 220 to investigate the possibility of corporate wrongdoing." (cita-
tion omitted)); In re J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. S'holder Litig., 906 A.2d 8o8, 823 (Del. Ch.
2005) ("Finally, as noted above, the plaintiffs here did not make a section 22o books and
records demand. If they had, they would have been able to investigate the decision-making
process behind the qualification of the directors as independent under the NYSE Corporate
Governance rules. Instead, they rely on conclusory allegations that do not create a reasonable
doubt about Futter's or Kaplan's independence based on the charitable ties to The American
Museum of Natural History.").
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personal friendship is negligible. The types of records that demonstrate a
lack of independence will rarely be in the possession of the corporation.88
Yet this is the very position taken by the courts. In Beam, the Delaware
Supreme Court delineated some of the types of information that might be
available:
For example, irregularities or "cronyism" in [the company's] process of
nominating board members might possibly strengthen her claim concern-
ing Stewart's control over [the company's] directors. A books and records
inspection might have revealed whether the board used a nominating com-
mittee to select directors and maintained a separation between the director-
selection process and management. A books and records inspection might
also have revealed whether Stewart unduly controlled the nominating pro-
cess or whether the process incorporated procedural safeguards to ensure
directors' independence. Beam might also have reviewed the minutes of
the board's meetings to determine how the directors handled Stewart's pro-
posals or conduct in various contexts. 89
The information, which the court conceded "might possibly" strengthen a
claim, relates more to the issue of control over the nomination process-not
to the strength of the friendship.190 Stewart, with ninety-four percent of the
voting shares, already had complete control.'9 How additional evidence of
188 That fact, however, does not prevent the courts from claiming otherwise. See In re J.P.
Morgan Chase & Co. S'holder Litig., 906 A.2d 8o8, 820 (Del. Ch. 2005) ("Furthermore, the
plaintiffs could have used section 220 to learn more about the relationships between Harrison
[the CEO] and the defendant directors. As the Delaware Supreme Court noted in Beam,
plaintiffs who seek information under section 220 may be able to review the minutes of board
meetings and determine how the directors handled the CEO's proposals or conduct in various
contexts. Armed with this information, the plaintiffs may have been able to link the alleged
relationships to directors' conduct through particularized facts." (footnote omitted)). At most,
the information would show how directors voted, information generally viewed by Delaware
courts as irrelevant in determining independence. See Khanna, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 86, at
*57-58.
189 Beam, 845 A.2d at 1056 (footnote omitted); see also Amalgamated Bank v. UICI, No.
884-N, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 82 (Del. Ch. June 2, 2005) (quoting favorably the language em-
ployed by the Supreme Court of Delaware in Beam, 845 A.zd at IO56); Haywood v. AmBase
Corp., No. 3 42-N, 2oo5 Del. Ch. LEXIS 131, at *28 (Del. Ch. Aug. 22, 2005) (same); Beam
v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961, 981-82 (Del. Ch. 2003) ("It is troubling to this Court that, notwith-
standing repeated suggestions, encouragement, and downright admonitions over the years
both by this Court and by the Delaware Supreme Court, litigants continue to bring derivative
complaints pleading demand futility on the basis of precious little investigation beyond pe-
rusal of the morning newspapers.").
I9O This assumes that companies preserve evidence of "cronyism" in their minutes, an
unlikely proposition.
191 SeeBeam, 845 A.2d at 1045 ("Martinez was recruited for the board by Stewart's long-
time personal friend, Charlotte Beers .... When Beers, a longtime friend and confidante to
Stewart, resigned from the Company's board in September 2001, Moore was nominated to
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"cronyism" would affect the analysis is hard to discern,1 9 particularly given
the court's general impatience with this type of information. 193
Using inspections rights as a substitute for discovery has other prob-
lems. Minutes of board meetings are often thin in content,19' and therefore
will not typically reveal problems among directors or cronyism. Nor is the
provision allowing inspection easy to use. Shareholders must have a proper
replace her.").
192 See In re W. Nat'l Corp. S'holders Litig., No. 15927, 2ooo Del. Ch. LEXIS 82, at
*52-53 (Del. Ch. May 22, 2000) ("Directors must be nominated and elected to the board in
one fashion or another. The fact that a company's executive chairman or a large shareholder
played some role in the nomination process should not, without additional evidence, auto-
matically foreclose a director's potential independence." (footnote omitted)); see also Aronson
v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 (Del. 1984) (observing that a forty-seven percent stockholder who
personally selected all of the directors of the corporation was not sufficient to establish that
the stockholder dominated and controlled the corporation's board of directors), overruled in
partby Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); In re W Nat'lCorp. S'holders Litig., 2ooo Del.
Ch. LEXIS 82, at *53 ("Essentially, plaintiffs ask that I declare these two outside directors
incapable of exercising independent, good faith business judgment merely because they did
not find their way onto the Company's board through an independent nominating committee.
Although independent nominating committees may indeed have a salutary effect on board ef-
ficacy and independence, and are surely a 'best practice' which the corporate governance com-
munity endorses, they are not a sine qua non for director independence under Delaware law."
(footnote omitted)); Andreae v. Andreae, No. 11905, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 44, at * 13 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 5, 1992) (noting that Delaware courts have consistently rejected the notion that a director
cannot act independently of the entity that appointed him or her to the board).
193 See Weinstein Enters. v. Orloff, 870 A.2d 499, 512 (Del. 2005) ("To establish that the
committee was not independent, it is not enough for Orloff to assert that the Mays directors
were nominated by Weinstein, the majority stockholder that controlled the outcome of the
board election." (footnote omitted)); Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 891 A.2d 150,
177 (Del. Ch. 2005) ("Becker's appointment to the Bluegreen board did not involve extraor-
dinary circumstances; people normally get appointed to boards through personal contacts."),
aff'd, 906 A.2d 114 (Del. 2oo6); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health
Servs., Inc. v. Elkins, No. 20228-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 122, at *38 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24,
2004) ("Since the Complaint pleads a pattern of Board deferral to Elkins, the Plaintiff argues,
the Board can be said to lack independence from Elkins. General allegations of domination
over a Board are simply not sufficient under Delaware law to state a traditional duty of loyalty
claim." (footnote omitted)); In re The Ltd., Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 17148-NC, 2002 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 28, at *24 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2002) ("Gee, as the result of nominations by Mr.
Wexner, serves on the boards of both The Limited and a subsidiary of The Limited. These
facts, whether viewed singly or cumulatively, do not support any inference questioning Gee's
independence.").
194 Donald Pease, Outside Directors: Their Importance to the Corporation and Protection from
Liability, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 25, 62 0987) ("It is essential, therefore, that the minutes specify
the action taken and other matters considered at any meeting. Since minutes are subject
to subpoena, they should be carefully written to reflect accurately the action taken and the
other items on the agenda that were considered. Minutes should not include extraneous and
unnecessary information."). Needless to say, to the extent information about the nomination
process may somehow contribute to a finding of lack of independence, the information may
be deemed "extraneous and unnecessary."
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purpose,"S' describe the sought after records with particularity, and pay the
expenses associated with any challenge,' 96 resulting in delay and additional
costs with little benefit.
19 7
The emphasis on inspection rights has obscured the real problem. The
failure to meet the pleading requirements does not flow from a systematic
failure of shareholders to seek the necessary facts. The real problem arises
from a pleading standard that imposes unrealistic burdens and is applied
inconsistently. The solution is not to require an invocation of inspection
rights but to permit discovery on the issue.19
V. CASE STUDY: TIlE SAGA OF THE Two MICHAELS
Perhaps the best single case to illustrate the problems discussed in this ar-
ticle is the derivative suit filed against the Disney board in connection with
the employment contract awarded to Michael Ovitz. The contract was, by
most measures, excessive, paying Ovitz a reported $140 million for slightly
more than a year of unsuccessful service.199
An employment contract for an executive who is not a member of the
board would ordinarily be subject to the business judgment rule and pre-
sumed fair. To the extent that an agreement benefits someone on the
board, however, the duty of loyalty applies, leaving the directors the bur-
den of establishing fairness. To render this standard applicable, therefore,
shareholders in Disney had to establish that Michael Eisner somehow bene-
fited from the Ovitz employment contract. They asserted both that Eisner
influenced the terms of the agreement out of his friendship with Ovitz and
that he controlled the board. 00
195 Haywood v. Ambase Corp., 2oo5 Del. Ch. LEXIS 13 1, at *22 (Del. Ch. Aug. 22, 2005)
("Haywood and Cronin seek to inspect AmBase's books and records to determine exactly
these types of things. In the circumstances of this case, the evidence provides a reasonable
basis to question the board's independence. Thus, I find that Haywood and Cronin's desire to
investigate that subject constitutes a proper purpose for a § 220 demand.").
196 Where companies wrongfully refuse to permit inspection, requiring litigation, courts
do not routinely award costs to shareholders. See supra note 163.
197 For example, the courts have made it very difficult for shareholders to obtain copies
of records held by a subsidiary, at least where the subsidiary had independent directors on the
board. See Weinstein Enters., 870 A.2d at 5 11.
198 See infra note 236. At least one court has acknowledged the practical difficulty of
obtaining the information necessary to meet the pleading requirements. See supra note 12 1.
199 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244,253 (Del. zooo) (describing the payment as over $140
million, including $39 million in cash). The amount and terms seemed excessive, providing
arguably inappropriate incentives. Under the agreement, Ovitz gained greater amounts the
sooner he quit. Ordinarily, compensation is designed to retain management rather than en-
courage management to quit.
zoo According to the complaint:
Eisner is a long-time colleague of Ovitz who, at least at the time
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On a motion to dismiss, without the benefit of discovery, the chancery
court concluded the plaintiffs had not produced "reasonable doubt" about
the independence of the Disney board. In reaching that conclusion, the
court found as "independent": a director who served as an officer,"1 a direc-
tor who headed a charity that received $1 million directly from Eisner, 02 a
director who was a principal of an elementary school at one time attended
by Eisner's children, 0 3 a director who received $50,000 for consulting ser-
vices and who worked for a law firm representing Disney,04 and a director
whose wife received funds to start her business. 05 This so called "indepen-
of the Employment Agreement was "negotiated," was a close personal
friend of Ovitz. In fact, as Ovitz stated in conjunction with the an-
nouncement of his departure from the Company, "Michael Eisner has
been my good friend for 25 years and that will not change...."
Stockholders' Derivative Complaint at 21-22, Brehm v. Eisner, No. 15452 NC (Del. Ch. Jan.
6, 1997).
201 Roy Disney served as a "top executive" and received "numerous, valuable options
on Disney stock." In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.zd 342, 356 (Del. Ch.
1998), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Brehm, 746 A.2d 244. The court, however, gleaned
facts from the proxy statement (despite the fact that the matter was being heard on a motion
to dismiss) that Disney and his family owned approximately 8.4 million shares with a value
of $2.1 billion. Id. The court concluded that the "only reasonable inference that I can draw
about Mr. Disney is that he is an economically rational individual whose priority is to protect
the value of his Disney shares, not someone who would intentionally risk his own and his
family's interests in order to placate Eisner." Id. The court did so while lumping all shares of
the Disney "family" together, without isolating the benefit to Roy Disney or defining what
was meant by "family." More importantly, while it is possible that share ownership may com-
pensate for the income stream received by Roy Disney, this seems to be an intensely factual
issue. For example, Disney was about the amount paid to Ovitz. The impact of the payment on
share prices presumably would need to be greater than the income stream (salary) received by
Roy Disney. Nothing in the case addresses the issue.
202 In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.zd 693, 761 n.488 (Del. Ch.
2005), aff'dsub nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2oo6) ("O'Donovan was president of
Georgetown University from 1989 to 2001, (Eisner served on Georgetown University's board
of directors from 1985 to 1991) where Eisner's son attended college until 1992, and to which
Eisner made a $i million donation in 1996 at O'Donovan's request." (citations omitted)).
203 See id. ("Reveta Bowers is an administrator of a private school in West Hollywood,
California, that was attended by three of Eisner's children, and to which Eisner and entities
related to the Company have made substantial contributions .... " (citations omitted)). To
arrive at the conclusion, the court had to determine categorically that directors' fees were not
material. For a criticism of that conclusion, see Larry CatA Backer, People of Color, Women, and
the Public Corporation: Director Independence and the Duty of Loyalty: Race, Gender, Class, and the
Disney-Ovitz Litigation, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. IOl l, io6i (2005).
204 See In re The Walt Disney Co, Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d at 761 n.488 ("Mitchell was
hand-selected by Eisner to serve on the board, and now serves as chairman, a position which
provides Mitchell with substantial remuneration worth about $500,000 annually .... " (cita-
tions omitted)). Mitchell also worked for a law firm that billed Disney more than $120,000.
205 In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 358 ("The $121,122 payment to
Wilson's wife's design firm for services performed is immaterial to Wilson, a man who received
a bonus and stock options that, by Plaintiffs' own estimations, have resulted in over $70 mil-
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dent" board was branded the worst corporate board for two years running
by a magazine surveying corporate governance practices.
0 6
But it was the analysis of the relationship between the two Michaels
that stretched reality the furthest. Plaintiffs argued the long term "per-
sonal" and "business" relationship between the two men rendered Eisner
interested in the Ovitz employment contract. Eisner, the plaintiffs argued,
was motivated by friendship rather than the best interests of shareholders
in negotiating with Ovitz.
The trial court treated the entire approach in a dismissive fashion, dis-
posing of the matter in two sentences:" 7 'This argument, however, finds
no support under Delaware law. The fact that Eisner has long-standing
personal and business ties to Ovitz cannot overcome the presumption of
independence that all directors, including Eisner, are afforded." ' 8 That
was it. No analysis. No facts. No discovery."°
On appeal, the Supreme Court relied on the same superficial and cur-
sory reasoning. 10 The decision said nothing about the close relationship
between the two men and again, in two sentences, dismissed the claim.
The Court of Chancery held that "no reasonable doubt can exist as to Eis-
ner's disinterest in the approval of the Employment Agreement, as a matter
of law," and similarly that plaintiffs "have not demonstrated a reasonable
doubt that Eisner was disinterested in granting Ovitz a Non-Fault Termina-
lion in income realized so far.").
2o6 This was the same board that one survey assessing standards of corporate gover-
nance labeled the worst in the nation. John A. Byrne, The Best and Worst Boards, Bus. WK.,
Dec. 8, 1997, at 90 ("Disney's directors have won the dubious distinction of being named the
worst board in America in Business Week's second annual analysis of the state of corporate
governance. Institutional investors and boardroom watchers scorn what they see as a meek,
handpicked group, many of whom have long ties to Eisner or the company."); see also Robert
W. Lear & Boris Yavitz, The Best and Worst Boards of s995: Evaluating the Boardroom, CHIEF
EXECUTIVE, Nov. 1995, at 24 (rating boards on basis of corporate governance principals and
stating that Disney has one of the "worst boards").
207 Despite the summary treatment of the issue, the trial court had sufficient reserva-
tions to treat Eisner as interested and to analyze the independence of the board. In re The Walt
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 354-55.
208 Id. at 355.
2o9 The plaintiffs were forced into arguing that Eisner somehow benefited financially
from the transaction. Id.
210 See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.zd 244, 257 (Del. 2000) ("The facts supporting plaintiffs'
claim that the New Board was not disinterested or independent turn on plaintiffs' central al-
legation that a majority of the Board was beholden to Eisner. It is not alleged that they were
beholden to Ovitz. Plaintiffs' theory is that Eisner was advancing Ovitz' interests primarily be-
cause a lavish contract for Ovitz would redound to Eisner's benefit since Eisner would thereby
gain in his quest to have his own compensation increased lavishly. This theory appears to be in
the nature of the old maxim that a 'high tide floats all boats.' But, in the end, this theory is not
supported by well-pleaded facts, only conclusory allegations." (footnotes omitted)).
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tion." Plaintiffs challenge this conclusion, but we agree with the Court of
Chancery and we affirm that holding.
211
Both courts rendered their decisions without allowing plaintiff to engage in
discovery to explore the relationship. In other words, the courts found that
the evidence did not even present "reasonable doubt" about the relation-
ship between Ovitz and Eisner.
In the ordinary course of things, that would be the end. To guess what
might have been uncovered had discovery proceeded would be a matter
of speculation. But, of course, there was nothing ordinary about Disney. It
continued, culminating in a lengthy trial with a voluminous record and a
second appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court. The relationship between
the two Michaels also became the subject of a high profile book. From
these sources, considerable additional information about the relationship
surfaced, including that:
* The two had been "close" friends for nearly a quarter of a cen-
tury"'2 and "were very well acquainted, both socially and profession-
ally;
'2 1 3
* Ovitz was Eisner's closet friend in Hollywood;
14
* The wives of the two men were best friends;
1 5
211 Id. at 258 (footnotes omitted). With Eisner not having an interest in the outcome
of the transaction, there was no interested influence on the board and no reason to examine
the independence of the rest of the board. Id. ("[Wle hold that the Complaint fails to create
a reasonable doubt that Eisner was disinterested in the Ovitz Employment Agreement, we
need not reach or comment on the analysis of the Court of Chancery on the independence of
the other directors for this purpose.").
212 See Brehm v. Eisner, 906 A.2d 27, 36 (Del. 2oo6) ("Eisner and Ovitz had enjoyed
a social and professional relationship that spanned nearly 25 years."). The same court that
refused to allow discovery into the closeness of the relationship noted on four occasions in a
later opinion the closeness of the relationship and the fact that it lasted twenty-five years. See
In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 279 (Del. Ch. 2003) (Ovitz "had,
however, been Eisner's close friend for over twenty-five years."). The disingenuousness of
the approach forced an explanation. Id. at 287 n.3o ("The allegation that Eisner and Ovitz
had been close friends for over twenty-five years is not mentioned to show self-interest or
domination. Instead, the allegation is mentioned because it casts doubt on the good faith and
judgment behind the Old and New Boards' decisions to allow two close personal friends to
control the payment of shareholders' money to Ovitz.").
213 In reThe Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 699 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff'd
sub nom. Brehm, 906 A.2d 27. Appellants' brief described them as "life partners." Appellants'
Opening Brief at 8, In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 699 (Del. Ch.
zoo5).
214 JAMES B. STEWART, DISNEY WAR 37 (Simon & Schuster 2005) (noting that the relation-
ship had existed since before he joined Disney).
215 James B. Stewart, Partners, Eisner, Oviiz, and the Disney Wars, NEW YORKER, Jan. 10,
2oo5, at 46,48.
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* The two families vacationed as a group and spent Christmas to-
gether in Aspen in 1995; 16
* Eisner's wife called Ovitz when Eisner unexpectly had open-
heart surgery and Ovitz terminated a planned vacation to come to
the hospital;'
t 7
a Eisner invited Ovitz to be with him and his wife while awaiting
the final decision on whether he would be appointed as CEO of
Disney;
218
* Eisner would use effusive terms when writing to Ovitz.1 9 A let-
ter written by Eisner in October 1996 included: "You still are the
only one who came to my hospital bed-and I do remember.";"0
* Ovitz would use effusive terms when writing to Eisner;"2 ' and
" Ovitz sat on board of the New York Museum of Modern Art with
Sid Bass, one of Disney's largest individual shareholders.
2 22
In other words, despite the four dismissive sentences by the Delaware
courts, the two had cultivated an extraordinarily close personal relation-
ship over a protracted period of time that encompassed their respective
families. An examination of their interlocking business relationships would
no doubt have added to the plaintiffs' showing of the strength of the rela-
tionship. Most of the information, however, was not in the public domain
and was only uncovered by the sleuth of an author and the compulsion of a
trial."2 3
216 Id. at 54.
217 STEWART, supra note 214, at 175 (noting that Ovitz came and "took charge, which
seemed to come as a relief to Jane [Eisner's wife]."). Appellants brief described him as having
"guarded" the hospital room. Appellants' Opening Brief, at 8, In re Walt Disney Derivative
Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. zoo5).
218 STEWART, supra note 214, at 54-55.
219 STEWART, supra note 214, at zoo (noting that Eisner wrote in a letter to Ovitz "the
thank-you note Ovitz had written after their first trip to Disney World has so moved him that
he'd carried a copy of the letter with him ever since.").
220 Id. at 56.
221 Id. at 6o (noting that Ovitz wrote in a letter "how much we love your family and
enjoy the friendship").
222 Id. at 65; see also Brehm v. Eisner, 906 A.ad 27,39 n. 1 o (Del. zoo6) (describing Bass as
one of largest individual shareholders of Disney).
223 In fact, the failure to permit greater examination of the relationship and the indepen-
dence of the board likely resulted in some bad law. Without an interested Michael Ovitz or a
board that he controlled, the courts could not apply a duty of loyalty analysis to the transac-
tion. Thus, the board was never asked to demonstrate the fairness of the contract. Instead, the
courts were left with the duty of care and good faith. The result was a decision that tried to
squeeze the board's behavior into the duty of good faith by characterizing the facts in the com-
plaint as amounting to deliberate neglect. See In trThe Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825
A.2d 275, 278 (Del. Ch. 2003). The result was a confusion of the duties to be informed under
the business judgment rule, see Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,872 (Del. 1984), and good
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By summarily dismissing the allegations of friendship, the courts elimi-
nated any possible claim that the contract violated the duty of loyalty. As a
result, the burden remained on the plaintiffs to show a breach of the duty
of care, an all but insurmountable task, as they learned. The court resolved
these intensely factual issues without allowing for discovery.114 Had the
court allowed discovery on the relationship between the two Michaels and
appropriately decided the case under the duty of loyalty, the issue would
have turned on the fairness of Ovitz's employment contract, with the bur-
den on the board. This would have resulted in a proceeding that centered
around the substance of the agreement rather than the minimum level of
board attention permissible under the duty of care. In this long and volu-
minous litigation, the fairness of the agreement was never seriously exam-
ined.
VI. NECESSARY CORRECTIONS
Notwithstanding the uncertain value the market places on independence,22
Delaware has chosen to extend judicial protection to decisions approved by
boards consisting of a majority of independent directors. They do so out of
the ostensible belief that such approval dissipates the taint of the conflict
of interest or is mandated by statute. As has been discussed, this is simply
wrong.226 Section 144(a) requires no such thing. Moreover, the conflict is
faith. See Brehm, 9o6 A.2d 27 (discussing the issue). The case should have been treated under
the duty of loyalty, with fairness the operative issue for the litigation to resolve.
224 Following discovery and a trial, the chancery court would all but take a contrary view.
"[T]he board's collective kowtowing in regard to Ovitz's hiring is also due to Eisner's desire to
surround himself with 'yes men' and nonemployee directors with 'sycophantic tendencies."'
In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 761 n.488 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff'dsub
nom. Brehm, 9o6 A.zd 27; see also id. at 76o-61 ("Eisner stacked his (and I intentionally write
'his' as opposed to 'the Company's') board of directors with friends and other acquaintances
who, though not necessarily beholden to him in a legal sense, were certainly more willing
to accede to his wishes and support him unconditionally than truly independent directors."
(footnote omitted)).
225 There has been considerable debate on this topic. See generally Sanjai Bhagat &
Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation between Board Independence andLong-Term Firm Performance,
27 IOWA J. CoRP. L. 231 (2002); see also Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making
of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1592-93 (2005). It is of course a common
sense notion that independence alone, without consideration of other factors such as intel-
ligence, experience, and force of personality, would not automatically improve the quality of
the board. See supra note 82.
226 This is true no matter how many times someone on the court says otherwise. See Leo
E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New Challenges We
(and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673,678 (2005) ("Delaware tries to respect the business
judgment of disinterested directors and stockholders. How? By invoking the protection of the
business judgment rule if an interested transaction is approved by a majority of the indepen-
dent directors or by a majority of the disinterested stockholders, after full disclosure. The idea,
of course, is that the investment of ultimate power over the transaction in impartial directors
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allowed to remain in the decision-making process, potentially influencing
the final resolution.
Moreover, the test for independence and the restrictive (indeed, in
some cases, impossible) pleading standards all but ensures that these "in-
dependent" majorities will in at least some instances not be independent
at all."27 The result is that the almost insurmountable presumption of the
business judgment rule applies to transactions approved by interested
boards. Therefore, in the context of the duty of loyalty, fairness no longer
matters.
22 8
The weaknesses of the Delaware approach have already resulted in
considerable intervention by regulators. The self-regulatory organiza-
tions have opted for a more objective and categorical standard of indepen-
dence.229 Sarbanes-Oxley23 contains one of the toughest definitions of in-
dependence, prohibiting directors on the audit committee from receiving
any compensation (other than fees), whether direct or indirect.23 l And un-
like Delaware, the SROs impose quantitative requirements on the number
or stockholders suffices to police the conflict. By this instrumental means, Delaware law can
protect the resulting business decision without any loss of integrity, because the decision was
made or ratified by persons whose interests were aligned with those of the corporation and
its stockholders.").
227 And, of course, even those directors who meet some kind of reasonable standard of
independence may still favor management. See Velasco, supra note 14, at 842 ("Disinterested
directors may not have a financial interest in the transaction in question, but they may nev-
ertheless be conflicted with respect to the decision itself, if only because of its effect on a
colleague. The concept of structural bias suggests that too much deference is inappropriate
because of such conflict.").
2z8 The result is that a transaction viewed as unfair will be considered valid. This was too
much for the drafters of the ALl standard. Their formulation required that the transaction fall
within the "range of reasonableness." AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
§ 5.02(a)(2)(A) cmt. (1994).
229 The NYSE eschews a subjective definition, instead favoring categorical standards.
Under the NYSE definition, for example, any director employed by the company during the
prior three years is not independent. See N.Y.S.E., INC., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RULES §
303A(b) (2004). Delaware has no similar rule. Similarly, a director loses his or her indepen-
dence upon receiving $ioo,ooo or more during any twelve-month period in the prior three
years. The subjective importance of the payment to the director does not matter. In the case
of indirect payments, a director who is an executive officer of another company that receives
the greater of $I million or two percent of consolidated gross revenues will not be indepen-
dent. The test does not apply in the case of contributions to charities as long as the contribu-
tions are disclosed. See id.
230 Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley requires that directors serving on the audit committee
of public companies be independent, a definition that prohibits the acceptance of "any con-
sulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer." 15 U.S.C. § 78j-i (2005). Thus,
Congress expressly rejected the subjective materiality test used by the Delaware courts.
231 For a discussion of Sarbanes-Oxley and the preemptive effect on traditional areas of
state regulation, see Brown, supra note 25, at 336-38.
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of independent directors who serve on the board and important board com-
mittees. 3
None of these definitions or requirements apply to the states, 233 leaving
the standard for approval of conflict of interest transactions unaffected. 34
Delaware, therefore, continues to provide legal benefits to approval by
boards dominated and controlled by "interested" directors.
3
1
Adopting a more consistent application of the definition-one that truly
recognizes the full variety of influences that can affect independence-
would be a step in the right direction. So would reasonable pleading stan-
dards or at least the right to discovery on the issue of independence. 36
These approaches would effectively disqualify as independent a wider ar-
ray of directors, particularly close friends and those with financial connec-
tions unknown to the public.
Theoretically, the approach ought not cause significant concern. It
would ensure greater board independence, a recognized goal. 37 Regard-
232 See N.YS.E., INc., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RULES § 303A.ot (2004) (requiring that
a majority of the board consist of independent directors); see also Bhagat & Black, supra note
225, at 266 ("A third possibility is that some directors who are classified as independent are not
truly independent of management because they are beholden to the company or its current
CEO in ways too subtle to be captured in customary definitions of independence."). The
inclusion of a definition of independence in Sarbanes-Oxley represents another example of
the race to the bottom and the need for federal intervention to impose meaningful require-
ments. See Lucian A Bebchuk & Assaf Hamadani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from History,
1o6 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2oo6).
233 Having said that, Delaware courts refer to them when useful in dismissing an inde-
pendence challenge. See In re J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. S'holder Litig., 906 A.2d 8o8, 823 (Del.
Ch. 2005) (discussing director Bossidy). At least one commentator has described Delaware
law in this are as "[flar more important than federal law ... for purposes of internal corporate
governance." Donald C. Clarke, Setting the Record Straight: Three Concepts of the Independent
Director, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. (forthcoming zoo6) (manuscript at 23, available at http:l/ssrn.
com/abstract=892037).
234 See Fairfax, supra note 158, at 415 ("Sarbanes-Oxley does not appear to preempt
state law's treatment of director independence in any meaningful manner. States have the
discretion to determine the qualifications of directors and to assess whether directors should
be viewed as independent.").
235 Ultimately, without reform at the state-law level, this represents another area sus-
ceptible to federal preemption. Some have contended that reform in Delaware is not ex-
plained by a race with other states, but by concern over federal intervention. See Mark J.
Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HAav. L. REV. 588 (2003) (noting that the pressure for reform
in Delaware comes not from other states but from the fear of intervention by the federal
government). Perhaps the concern over intervention explains the Delaware Supreme Court's
belated recognition in Beam that personal relationships can deprive a director of his or her
independence.
236 Gelb, supra note 35, at 144 ("If Delaware really wanted the plaintiff to have a fair op-
portunity to determine the truth about a director's relationship to a defendant, it would allow
at least discovery limited to that issue.").
237 Thus, for example, the Business Roundtable has recommended that a "substantial
majority" of the board consist of independent directors. See Marianne M. Jennings, A Primer
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less, state law does not require the use of independent directors; it merely
provides legal advantages to those companies that employ them.
38
Practically, however, any change is likely to generate a hue and cry.23 9
The truth is that management in at least some cases does not want truly
independent directors deciding matters involving conflicts of interest. 40
These directors are likely to be less deferential to the CEO, perhaps affect-
ing salary decisions or other areas involving self-interest. 41
Given the inherent difficulty in ensuring independence, it is the di-
rector selection process that provides the greatest potential for ensuring
neutral decision-makers on the board . 4 This could occur, for example, by
on Enron: Lessons From A Perfect Storm of Financial Reporting, Corporate Governance and Ethical
Culture Failures, 39 CAL. W. L. REV. 163, 206 n. 207 (2003). The Business Roundtable is "an as-
sociation of chief executive officers of leading U.S. companies with over $4.5 trillion in annual
revenues and more than In million employees." See Business Roundtable, About Business
Roundtable, http://www.businessroundtable.orglaboutUs/index.aspx (last visited Oct. 24,
2oo6).
238 Public companies traded on an exchange must, of course, have a majority of direc-
tors that meet the definition of the relevant SRO. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
Under state law, however, there is no requirement of independent directors. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (2006) (noting that certificate of incorporation or bylaws "may prescribe
other qualifications for directors."); see also Donald C. Clarke, Setting the Record Straight: Three
Concepts of the Independent Director, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2oo6) (manuscript at 26,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=892037) ("But state corporate law in the United States
generally leaves this up to corporations themselves to decide; a corporation can have many,
few, or no independent directors, and investors can make their own decisions about whether
to invest.").
239 Tougher standards under state law would increase the risk of director liability. With
respect to violations of the rules/listing standards of the SROs, courts have generally con-
cluded that there is no private right of action. See J. ROBERT BROWN, JR., ThE REGULATION OF
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE § 3.06 (3d ed. 1994 & Supp. 2004).
24o Thus, directors on the compensation committee may have some type of relationship
or friendship with the CEO and still qualify as independent. In the context of Worldcom,
four of the directors were dubbed "Bernie's Boys" (as in friends of the former CEO Bernie
Ebbers). One of them was on the compensation committee. Steve Rosenbush, The Ebbers
Trial's Stars andExtras, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Jan. 25, 2005, http://www.businessweek.com. From
a state law perspective, however, they were likely considered independent. See also Rachel
A. Fink, Note, Social Ties in the Boardroom: Changing the Definition of Director Independence to
Eliminate "Rubber-Stamping" Boards, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 455, 480-82 (2OO6) (discussing pres-
ence of friends of CEO Conrad Black on the board of directors of Hollinger International).
241 Or, as Marty Lipton, one of the premier corporate lawyers in America, put it: "Boards
of directors, while independent in name, were not really independent and did not act as inde-
pendent monitors of management." Martin Lipton, Address at the Commercial Club: Bubbles
and Their Aftermath (Nov. 2002) (transcript available at http://www.thecorporatelibrary.com/
special/misc/7oo6z6-4.pdf). Similarly, while the Delaware courts considered the Disney board
to be independent as a legal matter, at least some in the market disagreed as a practical matter.
See supra note 2o6.
242 It would likely ensure not only independence but the other qualities necessary for
effective oversight. See supra note 82; see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Corporate Governance:
Directors vs. Shareholders?: The Case for Shareholder Access: A Response to the Business Roundtable,
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facilitating nominations by non-management shareholders 43 These direc-
tors would presumably have a greater likelihood of remaining independent
of the CEO and avoiding the problem of "structural bias." 44 Unsurpris-
ingly, Delaware, as well as the Securities and Exchange Commission, 4s has
made this difficult by allowing companies to impose restraints on share-
55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 557, 562 (2005) ("Although the recent strengthening of director in-
dependence might well be beneficial, it does not obviate the need for the safety valve of a
viable mechanism for shareholder replacement of directors. The mere independence of direc-
tors from insiders ensures neither that directors are well selected nor that they have the right
incentives to advance shareholder interests."). The NYSE has moved in this direction by
requiring that listed companies have nominating committees consisting entirely of indepen-
dent directors. See N.Y.S.E., INC., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RULES § 303A (2004). Moreover,
the SEC has required disclosure of the method used in identifying nominees. See Item 7,
Schedule 14A, 17 C.ER. § 240.14a-ioI (2006). In effect, both reforms attempt to reduce the
influence by the CEO on the nomination process. Some anecdotal evidence indicates this
is having an effect. See Alan Murray, Leash Gets Shorterfor Beleaguered CEOs, WALL ST. J., Aug.
23, 2oo6, at A2 ("The firing of a CEO used to be a rare event-even the worst of them often
managed to cling to power with remarkable tenacity. In the past two years, however, CEO fir-
ings have become common place."). Of course, the approach does not apply to all companies,
relies on the NYSE definition of independent, and does not prevent the CEO from making
recommendations to the committee. While a step in the right direction, therefore, it is not
likely to ensure that truly independent directors sit on the board.
243 Shareholders can, of course, already nominate directors. The difficulty arises in
the costs associated with their election. Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William 0.
Douglas-The Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 79, 123 (2005) ("There is nothing to prevent any shareholder from nominating a
director in opposition to a director nominated by a current board, though it can be a costly
endeavor."). Commentators have suggested that the costs of electing shareholder nominees
be born by the company, at least in some cases. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A
Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1135 (1990).
z44 See Paredes, supra note 149, at 761 ("It is reasonable to assume that a shareholder
nominee who is elected to the board will be more responsive to shareholders and more willing
to challenge the CEO, as well as other senior managers and directors.").
245 See 17 C.FR. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2oo6) (prohibiting shareholders from submitting pro-
posals that "relate[] to an election for membership on the company's board of directors").
The Second Circuit, however, rejected the agency's interpretation that the provision pre-
cluded proposals to amend the bylaws and permit shareholder nomination of directors. See
Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, Employees Pension Plan v. Am. Int'l Group,
Inc., 462 E3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2oo6). This is not the first time the courts have had to remind
the Commission of the investor protection nature of the shareholder proposal rule. See Med.
Comm. For Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 68o-8i (D.C. Cir. 1970) (stating the primary
purpose of section 14(a) is to protect investors), vacatedas moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972). In fairness,
the SEC did propose rules that would have permitted shareholder nominations, see Security
Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48626, Investment Company Act
Release No. 262o6, 81 S.E.C. Docket 770 (Oct. 14, 2003), and increased the disclosure of the
director nomination process. See Disclosure Regarding Nomination Committee Functions &
Communications Between Security Holders & Boards of Directors, Securities Act Release
No. 8340, Exchange Act Release No. 48825, Investment Company Act Release No. 26262, 8 1
S.E.C. Docket 2135 (Nov. 24, 2003). The shareholder nomination rules were never adopted.
The disclosure rules are not likely to be particularly effective. SeeJ. Robert Brown, Jr. & Celia
R. Taylor, A Seat at the Board, TEx. LAW., May 3, 2004, at Sio.
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holder nominations."4 To the extent that this continues, it is another area
ripe for federal preemption.1
47
Facilitating nominations will not ensure election." s Another alternative
might be to require the inclusion of shareholder nominees in management's
slate of directors. z49 Committees representing shareholders could, for ex-
ample, be given the right to designate a specified number of nominees."' 0
Courts also need to abandon the characterization of a majority inde-
pendent board as "neutral" for purposes of eliminating fairness and the
application of the business judgment rule. Neutrality is not a rote process
of counting directors, with a majority the automatic tipping point. Neutral-
ity is a process of ensuring the absence of the interested influence. The
presumption should, therefore, go the other way. To the extent interested
influence remains a part of the decision making process, the presumption
should be that the board is not neutral. The burden should be on the board
to show otherwise by, for example, using a special committee consisting
entirely of independent directors.
246 Delaware courts have approved of bylaws designed to restrict the ability of sharehold-
ers to nominate directors. See Stroud v. Grace, 6o6 A.zd 75, 95-96 (Del. 1992); see also Acciptier
Life Scis. Fund, L.P. v. Heifer, 905 A.2d 115, 126-27 (Del. Ch. 2oo6) (refusing to grant relief
to shareholders who wanted to nominate directors where bylaws gave them 1o days after an-
nouncement of meeting date and announcement buried in earnings press release).
247 See supra note 235.
248 China permits shareholder nominations but does not ensure that those nominated
will be elected. See Donald C. Clarke, The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance,
31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 125, 196 (2oo6) ("Yet it is far from clear how this requirement would play
out in elections of independent directors."). The corporate code in Israel requires the pres-
ence of two "outside" directors on the boards of public companies. Outside directors must
receive at least one-third of all votes not cast by controlling shareholders. See Yael T Ben-Zion,
The Political Dynamics of Corporate Legislation: Lessons from Israel, i I FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN.
L. 185, 271 (2006).
249 Slight movement has occurred in this direction. The SROs require a nominating
committee consisting of independent directors. See N.Y.S.E., INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL
§ 303A.04(a) (2003). The SEC requires disclosure in the proxy statement of any "policy with
regard to the consideration of any director candidates recommended by security holders." 17
C.ER § 240.14a-Ioi(Item 7)(d)(2)(ii)(E) (2oo6).
25o For a discussion of this approach, see George W. Dent, Jr., Corporate Governance: Still
Broke, No Fix in Sight, 31 J. CORP. L. 39, 67 (2005).
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Using a truly neutral decision-making body still begs the question of the
appropriate standard of review. As courts,15' commentators, s2 the ALI,"s3
and common sense recognize, it is never entirely possible to dissipate the
taint of the conflict from the decision-making process.M4 Application of the
business judgment rule eliminates any consideration of fairness despite the
obvious possibility that the transaction may be motivated by a desire to aid
the interested director.
At the same time, benefits should accrue to a decision-making process
that relies on truly independent directors. Doing so would leave to the
board, rather than the courts, the determination of those conflict of inter-
est transactions that benefit the company. Rather than apply the business
judgment rule, which presupposes a complete absence of a conflict of inter-
est, neutral approval should only shift to the plaintiffs the burden of show-
ing the unfairness of the transaction. This is the standard already used by
the Delaware courts in the context of controlling shareholders. 5 5 Such a
251 See Shlensky v. S. Parkway Bldg. Corp., i66 N.E.2d 793, 8oo (Il. 196o) (holding that
disinterest approval shifts burden of establishing fairness); see also Sobek v. Stonitsch, 995
F.Supp. 918,922 (N.D. Ill. 1998). Other courts have found that disinterested approval merely
shifts the burden. See Sullivan v. Easco Corp., 656 FSupp. 531, 535 (D. Md. 1987).
252 Bratton, supra note 62, at io88-89 ("To accord this process anything approach-
ing preclusive legal effect, however, threatens the integrity of the norm of selfless conduct.
Disinterested directors, as colleagues of the interested directors, often approach self-dealing
transactions in a spirit of accommodation."); see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Self-Interested
Transactions in Corporate Law, 13 J. CORP. L. 997, 1002 (1988) (stating that Eisenberg has cau-
tioned that "directors, by virtue of their collegial relationships, are unlikely to treat one of
their number with the degree of wariness with which they would approach a transaction with
a third party.").
253 Section 5.02 of the ALl formulation provides an intermediate standard. With approv-
al by disinterested shareholders, plaintiff must show that the disinterested directors "could
not reasonably have concluded that the transaction was fair to the corporation at the time
of its authorization." As the comment to the section explained: "[Ihf a transaction between a
director or a senior executive and the corporation is authorized in advance by disinterested
directors (or in the case of a senior executive who is not a director, by a disinterested supe-
rior), then a person attacking the transaction has the burden of proving not simply that the
transaction is unfair, but that the terms of the transaction are so clearly outside the range
of reasonableness that the directors or disinterested superior who authorized the transaction
could not reasonably have concluded at the time of such authorization that the transaction
was fair to the corporation." Although intermediate, some have characterized the standard as
closer to the business judgment rule than fairness. See Marleen A. O'Connor, How Should We
Talk About Fiduciary Duty? Directors' Conflict-of-Interest Transactions and the ALI's Principles of
Corporate Governance, 61 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 954, 958 (1993) (concluding that ALI standard is
closer to business judgment rule); see also Bratton, supra note 62, at i089 ("Their new standard
of scrutiny-reasonableness review of the directors' fairness determination-imports stricter
scrutiny than would the business judgment rule, but also purports to block full fairness review
by the courts.").
254 See supra notes 8o-8 1, 93-94, and accompanying text.
255 See supra notes 65-69.
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standard will continue to make the terms of the transaction relevant but at
the same time provide heightened protection to boards.
VII. CONCLUSION
Whatever the solution, the problem is clear. Delaware courts have employed
an approach that accords enormous deference to decisions by boards that
are not independent. The direct consequence has been the repeal of the
fairness requirement for transactions involving conflicts of interest. Courts
instead apply the business judgment rule, rendering the actual terms of the
transaction irrelevant.
All of this leads to a prediction: because they can, boards will continue
to avoid exercising significant control over self-interested transactions. Ex-
ecutive salaries will continue to escalate. Insiders will continue to obtain
excessive benefits and highly favorable terms. And when the abuses be-
come sufficiently severe, Congress will step in and override the state legal
regime.

